

Webinar Title: MPAP: A Two-Year Perspective

Presented by: Jeffrey Tarbell, ASA | Director | Houlihan Lokey

Webinar Description: Two years have quickly passed since The Appraisal Foundation issued VFR Valuation Advisory #3 -- better known as "The Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums" or MPAP. Has anything changed? And if so, what, how, and why? This webinar will provide participants with a refresher on core MPAP principles, the results of a peer survey on the impact of MPAP on various aspects of valuation practice, and a viewpoint on the measurement and application of "control premiums" moving forward.

Learning Outcomes:

Upon webinar completion, the participant will:

- Assess whether and why a control premium, or MPAP, is applicable to a particular subject interest;
- Identify situations where control premiums are appropriate -- and where they are not appropriate;
- Interpret where their own practice is consistent or inconsistent with their peers; and
- Develop valuation opinions consistent with modern theory regarding minority and control values.

WEBINAR SURVEY LINK: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/KR6DL32

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MPAP: A Two-Year Perspective

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Jeffrey S. Tarbell, ASA, CFA Houlihan Lokey February 21, 2020




Introduction

- The objective of this presentation is to elevate your understanding of MPAP
- Move those in Group 3 up to Group 2
- Move those in Group 2 up to Group 1

How familiar are you with "Valuations in Financial Reporting Valuation Advisory 3: The Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums" (a.k.a. the MPAP advisory) issued in 2017 by The Appraisal Foundation?

Answered: 178 Skipped: 0





A Short Refresher on the MPAP Advisory

+////

Evolution of the Control Premium

[A control premium] based on an arbitrary percentage determined by a 'rule-of-thumb' would not appear to be well reasoned"	Speech by Robert Fox of the SEC (2008)
"In any case, it is obvious that, given the current state of the debate, one must be extremely cautious about applying a control premium to public market values to determine a control level of value"	Business Valuation Discounts and Premiums, Pratt (2001) p. 40
"Valuation analysts who use the guideline public-company valuation method and then automatically tack on a percentage 'control premium' … had better reconsider their methodology"	Valuing a Business, 4th ed., Pratt (2000) p. 357
"[The guideline company method] usually requires some adjustment from the publicly traded minority stock value equivalent to account for control"	Valuing a Business, 3rd ed., Pratt (1996) p. 210
"If public stocks always trade at a discount to their controlling interest value, then why aren't they taken over?"	Control Premiums and Minority Interest Discounts In Private Companies, Nath (1990) p. 2




Polling Question #1



Valuation Advisory #3

- Authored by The Appraisal Foundation's Working Group on Control Premia
- First draft April 2013
- Second draft September 2015
- Published September 2017
- Non-authoritative guidance
- Targeted to the appraisers involved in the measurement of fair value for financial reporting purposes





Core Concepts of the MPAP Advisory

- Nath was right; what we've long called "control premiums" are likely something else
- Control prices reflect the expected economic benefits to the acquirer
- Quantification of such benefits typically focuses on:
 - Enhanced cash flows (synergies)
 - Lower cost of capital (risk)

"It has become widely accepted that the market evidence supplied by comparing the acquisition price to the publicly traded price does not represent a premium for conceptual control but, rather, represents a premium linked to actual changes that can be made by exercising that control. Control, and whether one has it, is not really the focal point. What matters is that, after an acquisition, the acquired company is now under different management/stewardship. A price higher than the publicly traded price might be reasonable if the new management and/or combined entity expect(s) improved cash flow or growth or reduced risk. If no improvements or risk reduction could reasonably be expected, there may be little ability for an acquirer to pay a price higher than the publicly traded price and still generate a reasonable return on its investment. In such cases, the control value may approximate the publicly traded price."



Definitions of New Terms

- An MPAP is the difference between
 - the pro rata fair value of the subject controlling interest and
 - its Foundation Value
- For public companies, Foundation Value is the quoted market price for the company's shares
- For private companies, Foundation Value is measured with respect to the current stewardship of the entity
 - Contemplates that the prerogatives of control continue to reside with the existing controlling shareholder(s)
 - Often what is referred to as the pro rata marketable, non-controlling value



Factors to Consider When Quantifying MPAP

- Acquisition activity in the relevant industry
- Subject company's stage in life cycle
- Attributes of market participants
- Size of subject company relative to market participants
- Balance of information
- Subject company's capital structure
- Management's objectives
- Quality of management
- Regulatory factors
- Corporate bylaws and governing documents
- Transaction structure





An MPAP Should Not Be Automatic

- If no room for improvement, why would a rational investor pay a premium to market price?
- Consider a subject company that is believed to be:
 - Well managed
 - Optimally capitalized
 - Reporting operating margins in line with (or higher than) peers
- The opportunities for a control buyer to generate incremental economic benefits would seem limited
- Would an MPAP be appropriate in this situation? Why?



Are Charts Like These Still Useful?







This Version Seems a Bit More Nuanced

Standard	l of Value	Level of Value	Common Definitions and Notes	
ent Value	Typical Strata of Fair Value and Investment Value	Strategic Control Value	The Strategic Control Level of Value is generally recognized using the standard of value referred to as Investment Value , which is defined as "the value to a particular investor based on individual investment requirements and expectations." Accordingly, the Strategic Control Level of Value is not generally consistent with fair market value [adequate consideration], in that it considers the motivations of a specific buyer as opposed to a hypothetical buyer. In other words, the "strategic control premium" is generally not appropriate under the fair market value standard	
Investment	۵	Financial Control Value		"The power to direct the management and policies of a business" This definition covers the tactical and strategic aspects of control
Fair Value / Inv	Fair Market Value	Marketable Minority Value	Could be minimally differentiated based on individual stockholder characteristics	Refers to the value of a non-controlling interest, or a minority interest that lacks control but enjoys the benefit of liquidity as if it were freely tradable in an active market Stock interests trading in the public equity markets are the prototypical example of a marketable minority interest
				A minority interest that lacks "the ability to [be] quickly convert[ed] to cash at minimal cost" "An asset, business, business ownership interest, security, or intangible asset" that lacks the capability and ease of transfer or salability"



Marketplace Perspective

- The market participant (a rational buyer) will pay no more than necessary to outbid the next most aggressive bidder for a given investment opportunity
- Bidder interest matters:
 - Where bidder interest is low, the market price is less likely to reflect significant MPAP benefit
- In no case is a market participant willing to pay an amount that exceeds the value of the maximum cash flows that can be generated through the business combination



Observed Premia Can Be Misleading

- In October 2019, LVMH announces bid to purchase TIF for EV of \$18.0 billion
- Pre-announcement, TIF's <u>expected</u> NTM EBITDA is \$1.073 billion, and TIF trades at 12.7x NTM EBITDA
- Offer implies a TTM EBITDA multiple of 16.8x
- Offered multiple is 32% above the trading multiple
- Perhaps LVMH believes TIF's EBITDA will be higher under its stewardship?
- If LVMH's <u>adjusted</u> NTM EBITDA were \$1.3 billion, the adjusted implied would be 13.9x, only 9.5% above the trading multiple



(\$ in billions)	Public Market Perspective	Market Participant Perspective
Enterprise Value	\$13.664	\$18.074
Forward EBITDA	\$1.073	\$1.300
Implied Multiple	12.7x	13.9x



Polling Question #2



Defining the Foundation Value

71/1/1

Alternative Definitions of Foundation Value

- The MPAP Advisory recommends using a Total Invested Capital (TIC) Foundation rather than an Equity Foundation to determine an MPAP
- In short, "the Working Group believes that the traditional method of calculating transaction premiums is potentially misleading"

"The Working Group concluded that the traditional method of calculating transaction premiums is potentially misleading. Specifically, the economic benefits realized through exercising the prerogatives of control enhance the fair value of the enterprise as a whole, not just the fair value of the equity.

Further, expressing the MPAP as a percentage of the Equity Foundation distorts the comparability of the MPAP among companies with different capital structures."



Example of Alternative MPAP Calculations

- As shown in the table at right, the dollar amount of the MPAP is \$1,000, whether viewed on a Foundation Value of Equity, TIC, or EV
- However, the indicated MPAP measured on a percentage basis differs
- Which of these is the most informative/useful?

\$ in millions		
	Marketable Minority Value	Control Value
Enterprise Value	\$5,000.0	\$6,000.0
+ Cash	\$500.0	\$500.0
= Total Invested Capital	\$5,500.0	\$6,500.0
 Interest-Bearing Debt 	\$1,500.0	\$1,500.0
= Equity Value	\$3,500.0	\$4,500.0
Indicated MPAP (Equity)		28.6%
Indicated MPAP (Enterprise Value)		20.0%
Indicated MPAP (Total Invested Capital)		18.2%




Note: The MPAP Advisory does not define TIC. I assume it refers to aggregate market value of equity plus all interest-bearing debt, as opposed to enterprise value (EV), which is typically defined as TIC less cash.

Remaining Poll Results

+11+11

Poll Question #2

To what degree do you agree with the guidance expressed in the MPAP advisory?




Answered: 115 Skipped: 63




Poll Question #3

For the following questions, please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements in the context of how your practice has or has not changed as a result of the MPAP Advisory guidance:

Answered: 143 Skipped: 35








Poll Question #4

My primary area of appraisal practice is?

Answered: 164 Skipped: 14





Key Points to Remember

- 1. The prerogatives of control have limited inherent value but are rather the means through which market participants implement strategies designed to generate economic benefits
- 2. MPAPs should be supported by reference to either enhanced cash flows or a lower required rate of return from the market participant perspective
- 3. The referenced economic benefits should be sufficient to provide market participants with an adequate return on the concluded fair value of the controlling interest
- 4. In many instances, such benefits will not be reliably identifiable, resulting in either no, or a small, premium
- 5. It is inconsistent with best practices to rely solely on benchmark premium data to evaluate the reasonableness of the MPAP in a fair value measurement
- 6. MPAP should be a byproduct of the valuation process rather than an exogenous input



Polling Question #3



Jeffrey S. Tarbell, ASA, CFA

- Mr. Tarbell is a member of Houlihan Lokey's Financial and Valuation Advisory business and has nearly three decades of experience providing valuation and financial opinions to private and publicly traded companies. He is Head of the firm's Estate and Gift Tax Valuation practice, Co-Head of the firm's Employee Stock Ownership Plan Valuation practice, and a member of the firm's Technical Standards Committee
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VALUATIONS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING VALUATION ADVISORY 3: THE MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATION OF MARKET PARTICIPANT ACQUISITION PREMIUMS



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VFR Valuation Advisory #3

The Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums

This communication is for the purpose of issuing voluntary guidance on recognized valuation methods and techniques.

Date Issued: September 6, 2017

Application: Business Valuation, Intangible Assets

Background: In recent years there have been increased requirements in the identification and recognition of assets and liabilities measured at fair value in financial statements. These requirements, promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), include:

- Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141(R), predecessor to Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) 805 *Business Combinations*; and
- FASB Statement No. 142, predecessor to ASC 350 *Intangibles Goodwill and Other* (ASC 350) and Accounting Standards Update (ASU) 2011-08.

Moreover, there has been increased focus on fair value measurement since the FASB issued Statement No. 157 (predecessor to ASC 820 *Fair Value Measurement*) in 2006 and ASU 2011-04 in 2011.

Furthermore, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has issued International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 3 (revised) (IFRS 3R) *Business Combinations* (IFRS 3R) and *IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement*, both of which are largely similar to the statements issued by the FASB.

Like ASC 350, International Accounting Standard 36 *Impairment of Assets* (IAS 36) includes the testing of goodwill for impairment. However, these standards are not converged, and the specific procedures of the goodwill impairment test are different. The measurements used to determine the recoverable amount, which is then compared to the carrying amount, differ; for example ASC 350 uses *Fair Value* whereas IAS 36 uses the lower of *Value in Use* or *Fair Value Less Costs of Disposal*. Further discussion of the differences between these accounting models is beyond the scope of this publication. Notwithstanding, concepts covered in this VFR Valuation

Advisory #3 may be applicable on a facts and circumstances basis when fair value is being determined in IAS 36.

During the creation of this document, members of the International Valuation Standards Council (IVSC) participated in certain discussions.

Because of the need for financial statements to be both reliable and relevant, valuation practices must provide reasonably consistent and supportable fair value conclusions. To this end, it is believed that guidance regarding best practices on certain specific valuation topics would be helpful. The topics are selected based on those in which the greatest diversity of practice has been observed. To date, The Appraisal Foundation has issued two Valuations in Financial Reporting (VFR) Advisories as follows: VFR Advisory #1, *The Identification of Contributory Assets and Calculation of Economic Rents* (May 31, 2010); and VFR Advisory #2, *The Valuation of Customer Related Assets* (June 15, 2016). In addition, guidance is currently under development on the topic of valuing contingent consideration.

This document presents helpful guidance for those that are preparing fair value measurements; however, this Advisory is not intended to be an authoritative valuation standard. The valuation of assets is a complicated exercise that requires significant judgment. The Working Group believes that consideration of the facts and circumstances related to the asset(s) that are being valued may sometimes support a departure from the recommendations in this Advisory. This Advisory seeks to present views on how to approach and apply certain aspects of the valuation process appropriate for measuring the fair value of controlling interests.

This VFR Advisory has been developed for measuring fair value for financial reporting and is not intended for other valuation contexts.

The Appraisal Foundation wishes to express its utmost gratitude to the Working Group on *The* Measurement and Application of Market Participant Acquisition Premiums for volunteering their time and expertise in contributing to this Advisory. Specifically, sincere thanks to the following individuals:

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The views set forth in this Advisory are the collective views of the members of this Working Group and do not necessarily reflect the views of any of the firms that the Working Group members are associated with.

This Advisory was approved for publication by the Board of Trustees of The Appraisal Foundation on September 6, 2017. The reader is informed that the Board of Trustees defers to the members of the Working Group for expertise concerning the technical content of the document.

The Appraisal Foundation served as a sponsor and facilitator of this Working Group. The Appraisal Foundation is the nation's foremost authority on the valuation profession. The organization sets the Congressionally authorized standards and qualifications for real estate appraisers, and provides voluntary guidance on recognized valuation methods and techniques for all valuation professionals. This work advances the profession by ensuring appraisals are independent, consistent, and objective. More information on The Appraisal Foundation is available at <u>www.appraisalfoundation.org</u>.

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BACKGROUND

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1 Premiums for control have long been a focus in business valuation.

Through the early 1990s, it was generally accepted that the publicly traded price of a company's shares represented the value of a minority interest and that, if the goal was to value a control interest, a "premium for control" would be added to the value of equity indicated by that publicly traded price. That premium generally came from market evidence in which the price paid to acquire an entire company was compared to the publicly traded price of that same company's shares prior to the acquisition.

8 However, in the late 1990s, this concept came into question and views have since been changing.
9 Various points have been made regarding why the control value of an entity might be no greater
10 than that indicated by its publicly traded price.

11 In any case, it has become widely accepted that the market evidence supplied by comparing the 12 acquisition price to the publicly traded price does not represent a premium for conceptual control 13 but, rather, represents a premium linked to actual changes that can be made by exercising that 14 control. Control, and whether one has it, is not really the focal point. What matters is that, after an acquisition, the acquired company is now under different management/stewardship. A price 15 higher than the publicly traded price might be reasonable if the new management and/or 16 combined entity expect(s) improved cash flow or growth or reduced risk. If no improvements or 17 18 risk reduction could reasonably be expected, there may be little ability for an acquirer to pay a 19 price higher than the publicly traded price and still generate a reasonable return on its investment.

20 In such cases, the control value may approximate the publicly traded price.

INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

This VFR Advisory sets forth best practices for certain issues encountered in measuring the fair value of controlling interests in business enterprises for financial reporting purposes. When valuing controlling interests in business enterprises, valuation specialists often reference the concept generally referred to as the control premium. The Appraisal Foundation's Subject Matter Expert Group on Best Practices for Valuations in Financial Reporting has identified the use of control premiums in fair value measurement as an area of considerable diversity in appraisal practice.

The most common instances of such fair value measurements include Step 1 of the goodwill impairment test, portfolio valuation for investment companies, and application of the acquisition method of business combinations for step acquisitions. Of these, the Working Group believes Step 1 of the goodwill impairment test is most prevalent.

In a 2008 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) speech, the topic of control premiums
 was raised. It was stated that, in cases where higher control premiums are used, the level of
 documentation required to support the control premium would also increase.¹

In fulfilling its mandate to provide best practices in the context of measuring fair value for financial reporting purposes, the Working Group has elected to introduce the term Market Participant Acquisition Premium (MPAP). The purpose of introducing this new term is twofold: (1) to emphasize the importance of the market participants' perspective when measuring fair value; and (2) to distinguish this premium from the more general (and occasionally controversial) notion of the control premium.

The best practices presented in this VFR Advisory have been developed for measuring fair valuefor financial reporting and are not intended for other valuation contexts.

This VFR Advisory is the result of deliberations by the Working Group and input received frominterested parties.

¹ Robert G. Fox III, "Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks before the 2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments," December 8, 2008, transcript, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch120808rgf.htm.

MARKET PARTICIPANT ACQUISITION PREMIUM

45 Concepts

46 Valuation specialists have long believed that the value of a business ownership interest is 47 influenced by the degree of control available to the subject interest's owner. The International 48 Glossary of Business Valuation Terms² defines control as "the power to direct the management and policies of a business enterprise."³ Both intuition and empirical observation suggest that the 49 presence (or absence) of the so-called prerogatives of control may influence the value of a 50 51 business ownership interest. In short, one would usually prefer to exercise control than not. As a 52 result, investors might be willing to pay more for a controlling interest than for an otherwise 53 comparable noncontrolling interest in the same enterprise.

54 To induce a rational investor to pay more for a controlling interest, the prerogatives of control 55 must give rise to the potential for incremental economic benefits. In other words, the prerogatives 56 of control have little inherent value, but rather have value to the extent that their exercise 57 enhances the economic benefits available to the owner of the subject controlling interest. Control 58 may be valuable if the exercise of control will enhance the enterprise's cash flows and/or reduce 59 the enterprise's risk. The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms defines a control premium as "an amount or percentage by which the pro rata value of a controlling interest 60 exceeds the pro rata value of a noncontrolling interest in a business enterprise, to reflect the value 61 62 of control."

63 Historically, the concept and/or measurement of the control premium has proven to be vexing and contentious to valuation specialists. Those of a more empirical disposition point to the range 64 of premiums observed in closed transactions as a starting point for analysis, while others observe 65 66 that the much larger population of public companies that are not acquired each year supports the theory that control premiums for most publicly traded companies either do not exist or are too 67 small to justify the costs and uncertainties associated with an attempted acquisition. In the 68 69 context of fair value measurement, the Working Group desires to reorient discussion and analysis 70 to the reasonable expectations of the relevant pool of market participants regarding cash flow 71 enhancement and risk reduction at the measurement date

² The International Glossary of Business Valuation Terms contains valuation terms and definitions adopted by five North American professional organizations that recognize business valuation as a professional discipline: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, American Society of Appraisers, National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, The Canadian Institute of Chartered Business Valuators, and The Institute of Business Appraisers.

³ The Working Group believes that this definition is consistent with instances where definitions of control appear in U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

72 **Definition**

73 In this VFR Advisory the Working Group has introduced the MPAP, defined as the difference 74 between: (1) the pro rata fair value of the subject controlling interest; and (2) its foundation. 75 Foundation is measured with respect to the current stewardship of the enterprise. In other words, 76 the foundation contemplates that the prerogatives of control will continue to reside with the 77 existing controlling shareholder or group of shareholders. The Working Group believes that 78 valuation specialists most commonly associate the *foundation* with the *pro rata* fair value of 79 marketable, noncontrolling interests in the enterprise. Therefore, for publicly traded companies, 80 the equity foundation is equal to the quoted market price for the company's shares. Foundation 81 value does not give consideration to discounts for lack of marketability/liquidity.

However, while the preceding describes an MPAP Equity Foundation concept, later in this Advisory an alternative way to think about the MPAP is introduced. It proposes that instead of utilizing the Equity Foundation to determine an MPAP, usage of a Total Invested Capital (TIC) Foundation may be more appropriate. (For clarity and emphasis, this use of the word "Foundation" will be capitalized in subsequent sections.)

87 Control and Marketability

The MPAP definition does not ascribe a particular degree of marketability to the subject controlling interest. The issue of marketability for controlling interests is a source of diversity in practice, as some valuation specialists apply discounts for lack of marketability to derive the fair value of controlling interests in privately held companies, while others do not. The Working Group believes in most cases sellers would have access to a market as a forum to transact.

Among the prerogatives of control is the discretion to pursue an orderly sales process in order to realize the (undiscounted) value of the interest while enjoying the benefits of ownership. Although transaction costs would not be considered part of fair value, fair value contemplates the usual and customary marketing activities for such interests. Controlling interests should not be held to the same standard of marketability as publicly traded equities because the markets (and associated marketing periods) differ. For controlling interests in business enterprises, the usual and customary marketing activities may be time consuming.

100 Illustrative Examples

101 Two examples serve to clarify the MPAP definition. First, consider a business enterprise that is 102 not publicly traded. The company's founder owns 70 percent of the outstanding shares and 103 continues to exercise control over the enterprise. The remaining 30 percent of the outstanding 104 shares are held by a number of investors, none of whom own more than 5 percent. Despite the 105 availability of numerous investment opportunities with indicated positive net present values, the 106 founder demonstrates little interest in growth and is averse to the use of debt financing. The price 107 per share paid by market participants for a controlling interest is likely to exceed that paid for a 108 noncontrolling (albeit hypothetically marketable) interest reflecting current stewardship of the 109 company. In other words, there is likely to be an MPAP. Its magnitude likely will be influenced 110 by the perceived ability of market participants to exercise the prerogatives of control to increase 111 the cash flows and/or reduce the discount rate applicable to the subject interest. Available 112 strategies include making investments to spur revenue and earnings growth (thereby potentially increasing cash flow), and employing a more typical financing mix for the industry (thereby 113 114 reducing the weighted average cost of capital). Some market participants may also expect cost 115 savings from eliminating redundancies. For privately held companies without near term liquidity expectations—much more so than publicly traded companies—there might also be cost savings 116 117 from adjusting compensation and other costs to market rates.⁴

118 Second, consider a business enterprise that is publicly traded. The business is generally believed 119 to be well managed, reporting operating margins in line with industry peers. The company has 120 created and marketed a unique technology and has generated significant historical revenue 121 growth. In this case, opportunities to generate economic benefits by exercising the prerogatives 122 of control are more limited. However, market participants may own complementary technologies 123 that, if marketed alongside that of the subject entity, would increase revenue growth. 124 Alternatively, market participants may have existing distribution networks capable of handling 125 the subject entity's products that would enhance profit margins. Similar to the other example, 126 market participants' perceptions of how prerogatives of control translate into value influence the investment decision. 127

128 In each case, the task of the valuation specialist is to identify and evaluate the feasibility of the 129 available strategies from the perspective of market participants for the subject interest. The 130 appropriate MPAP considers not only the magnitude of the available economic benefits, but also 131 the degree to which such potential benefits will influence the price paid by market participants 132 for the subject controlling interest in an orderly transaction at the measurement date. The 133 Working Group is not stating that the economic benefits must be precisely quantified in each 134 case. Rather, at a minimum, analysis should be performed to identify which form(s) of economic 135 benefit market participants would reasonably expect to enjoy and some general magnitude of the 136 effects of those benefits on value.

⁴ Whether such cost savings would contribute to the MPAP depends on how the above-market compensation and other costs were treated in measuring the foundation value. There is diversity of opinion in the profession as to situations where such "normalizing" adjustments are appropriate. The resolution of that controversy is beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.

137 **Concluding Observations**

The Working Group believes that MPAPs should be supported by reference to either enhanced cash flows or a lower required rate of return from the market participant perspective. The referenced economic benefits should be sufficient to provide market participants with an adequate return on the concluded fair value of the controlling interest. The Working Group anticipates that in many instances such benefits will not be reliably identifiable, resulting in either no, or a small, premium.

144 Notwithstanding the emphasis on cash flow and risk differentials in supporting MPAPs in fair 145 value measurement, the Working Group acknowledges the merit of analyzing historical data 146 regarding observed premiums from closed transactions. Such data might provide some examples of the extent to which buyers have expected improvement in cash flows or reduction of risk in 147 specific transactions. However, to conform to best practices, valuation specialists should 148 149 critically evaluate the quality and relevance of such benchmark premium data to assess its 150 applicability to the valuation subject. It is inconsistent with best practices to rely solely on 151 benchmark premium data to evaluate the reasonableness of the MPAP in a fair value 152 measurement.

CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 153 The Working Group believes that a persuasive fair value measurement for a controlling interest
- 154 in a business enterprise should be supported by a clear explanation of the incremental economic
- benefits available to market participants. In this section of the VFR Advisory, we discuss the
- 156 prerogatives of control that are the means for generating economic benefits and provide examples
- 157 of the economic benefits typically associated with changing control of a business enterprise. This
- Advisory also discusses the characteristics of a business enterprise that are likely to influence the
- 159 magnitude of the economic benefits available to market participants.

160 **Prerogatives of Control**

- 161 The prerogatives of control refer to the rights possessed by the owner of a controlling interest in a
- business enterprise to direct the management and policies of a business enterprise. Following is a
- 163 nonexhaustive list of the specific means by which such control is exercised:⁵
- 164 1. Appointing or changing operational management
- 165 2. Electing members of the board of directors
- 166 3. Determining management compensation and perquisites
- 167 4. Setting operational and strategic policy for the business
- 168 5. Acquiring, leasing, or liquidating business assets
- 169 6. Selecting suppliers, vendors, and subcontractors
- 170 7. Negotiating and consummating mergers and acquisitions
- 171 8. Liquidating, dissolving, selling, or recapitalizing the company
- 172 9. Selling or acquiring treasury shares
- 173 10. Registering the company's equity securities for an initial or secondary public offering
- 174 11. Registering the company's debt securities for public offering
- 175 12. Declaring and paying dividends
- 176 13. Changing the capital structure
- 177 14. Changing the articles of incorporation or bylaws
- 178 15. Selecting joint venture and other business partners
- 179 16. Making product and service offering decisions
- 180 17. Making marketing and pricing decisions
- 181 18. Entering into licensing and other agreements regarding intellectual property
- 182 19. Blocking any or all of the above actions

⁵ These items are based on lists appearing in *Business Valuation Discounts and Premiums*; by Shannon P. Pratt, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Second Edition, 2009, pages 17-18 and in *Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies*; by Shannon P. Pratt and Alina V. Niculita, The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., Fifth Edition, 2008, page 385.

The Working Group believes that the prerogatives of control noted above have limited inherent value, but are rather the means through which market participants implement strategies designed to generate economic benefits. For example, the bare ability to select a company's suppliers conveys no particular economic benefit to market participants, and therefore does not influence the fair value of a controlling interest. However, if selecting suppliers with whom market participants have existing relationships allows market participants to achieve a lower cost of sales, that economic benefit will potentially influence the MPAP.

190 Economic Benefits that Support MPAP

191 The Working Group believes that the economic benefits that support MPAPs ultimately manifest 192 in two ways: (1) enhanced cash flows; or (2) lower required rates of return. The task of the 193 valuation specialist is to identify the economic benefits available to multiple market participants 194 and support a magnitude of the amount by which such benefits may reasonably be expected to 195 increase the price paid by market participants for the subject interest over its Foundation value. 196 The Working Group notes that the economic benefits (for example, synergies) discussed herein 197 refer to those available to a group of market participants; those available only to a single market 198 participant generally would be excluded.⁶

199 Enhanced Cash Flows

200 Market participants contemplating purchase of a controlling interest in a business enterprise often 201 anticipate implementing business strategies that are not currently being implemented, or are not 202 available to be implemented, by the current owners. These strategies may increase cash flows or 203 improve investment returns through other strategy revisions. As stated previously, this Advisory 204 will refer to the concept of cash flow improvement to denote all forms of value-enhancing 205 investment and operational strategies. In all cases, an acquisition premium would only be 206 supported by changes believed to enhance the total return on investment. Potential improvements 207 may include the following areas, which are illustrative and not intended to be an all-inclusive list:

208 • Superior revenue growth. Market participants may have greater financial capacity and/or 209 willingness to invest more in positive net present value projects in order to fuel future 210 revenue growth than the incumbent ownership group. Alternatively, market participants may 211 have complementary products or services that are expected to increase sales of the subject 212 entity, the market participants, or both. Market participants may anticipate enhanced pricing 213 power following the acquisition of a competitor. They may have existing relationships with 214 customers that have previously been inaccessible to the subject entity. In addition, market 215 participants may have existing distribution networks that are broader than those of the subject 216 entity that could contribute to superior revenue growth.

⁶ Market participant synergies should be viewed in terms of the overall level of value enhancement achievable by multiple market participants rather than simply matching the nature of specific benefits.

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- 217 Increased operating margins. Market participants may anticipate increasing operating margins by eliminating redundant operating costs or achieving economies of scale through 218 the addition of incremental sales volume. Larger companies are often able to negotiate 219 220 superior terms with suppliers, resulting in lower cost of sales. For privately held companies, 221 market participants might expect increased margins through the normalization of 222 compensation and contract amounts that had not been at market-based rates.⁷
- 223 Working capital efficiencies. Relative to the subject entity under current stewardship, market • 224 participants may expect to maintain lower cash balances, negotiate more favorable payment 225 terms or inventory delivery schedules with suppliers, or have tighter credit policies.
- 226 Capital expenditure efficiencies. Market participants may have more favorable ongoing access to necessary capital equipment, or they may be able to consolidate production and 227 228 distribution capacity.
- 229 Regardless of the source, to be relevant in differentiating the fair value of a controlling interest, 230 the enhanced cash flows must be incremental to those expected by the subject entity under 231 current stewardship. In other words, enhanced cash flows giving rise to an MPAP are 232 incremental to prospective financial information that reflects the ongoing operations of the 233 business enterprise absent a change of control transaction.
- 234 We recognize that a fundamental aspect of understanding value of an entity is the prospective 235 financial information that management provides. The Working Group believes that forecasts 236 provided by management, unless they reflect information unknown to the market, have in most 237 circumstances been priced into and are represented by the publicly traded price. Indications of 238 value beyond the publicly traded price would need to reflect enhancements to cash flow or 239 reduction of risk that could be effectuated by an acquirer of the entity as discussed throughout 240 this Advisory.
- 241 Furthermore, implementation of strategies expected to generate cash flow benefits may require 242 the acquirer to incur significant costs. For anticipated revenue synergies, such costs may include 243 investments in incremental production capacity and/or distribution infrastructure. Anticipated 244 cost savings may be realized only after severance costs have been incurred. In all cases, the 245 anticipated cash flow benefits that contribute to MPAP should be assessed in combination with 246 required costs to implement the corresponding strategy.
- 247 The Working Group notes that there may be incremental risks to achieving forecast cash flow 248 enhancements and that such incremental risks may be considered in the valuation either by 249 adjusting the enhancements to cash flow or by adjusting the required rate of return, and any such
- 250 adjustments would need to be sufficiently supported.

⁷ Whether such cost savings would contribute to the MPAP depends on how the above-market compensation and other costs were treated in measuring the foundation value. There is diversity of opinion in the profession as to where such "normalizing" adjustments are appropriate. The resolution of that controversy is beyond the scope of this Valuation Advisory.

251 The effect of cash flow enhancements will influence the magnitude of the MPAP only to the

extent that market participants are willing to credit the subject entity with the economic benefits

resulting from them.

254 Lower Required Rate of Return

When evaluating the purchase of a controlling interest in a business enterprise, market participants may have a lower required rate of return than investors contemplating the purchase of an otherwise comparable noncontrolling interest in the entity under current stewardship. There are several reasons market participants may have a lower required rate of return for a controlling interest, including:

- Optimized capital structure. If the subject entity employs a suboptimal mix of debt and equity financing, the weighted average cost of capital may be reduced by adjusting the subject entity's capital structure. While it may be more common for companies to use a lessthan-optimal amount of debt financing, the costs of financial distress may also cause an overleveraged company to have an unfavorable cost of capital. Judgments as to the optimal capital structure for the subject entity may be made with reference to the observed capital structures of companies in the subject entity's industry.
- Company size benefits. Most valuation specialists agree that, all else being equal, larger companies enjoy lower costs of capital than smaller companies for reasons such as greater diversification, and increased purchasing and pricing leverage, among others. Often, market participants are larger than the subject entity and therefore have a lower cost of capital.
- *Reduced operating risk.* Market participants may perceive opportunities to reduce the operating risk of the business through strategies designed to reduce the volatility of raw material pricing, adopting a more variable cost structure, mitigating customer concentrations, or securing more long-term customer contracts, among others. Such measures may reduce the operating risk and cost of capital for the business enterprise.

Such effects will influence the magnitude of the MPAP only to the extent that market participants
are willing to credit the subject entity with the economic benefits resulting from a lower cost of
capital.

279 There is no consensus among valuation specialists regarding the relationship between the size of 280 the target and the required return from a market participant perspective. Some valuation 281 specialists observe that market participants use a cost of capital commensurate with the size of 282 the target when estimating the price to be paid in arm's length transactions. Others observe that 283 the market participants, when making investment decisions, use instead a cost of capital 284 reflecting the benefits of the increased size and diversification of the combined entity posttransaction. On the basis of its outreach efforts, the Working Group has concluded that both 285 286 perspectives (cost of capital based on the size of the target and cost of capital based on the size of 287 the combined entity post-transaction) are relevant when measuring fair value. When the 288 resulting range of value indications is wide, the importance of the valuation specialist's judgment 289 in selecting the point most reflective of fair value increases.

- The valuation specialist may seek to supplement this judgment with reference to the results
 of other valuation methods under the market or cost (asset-based) approaches. When this is
 done, the point in a range where there seems to be the most consensus across approaches
 could provide relevant insights implying which is the stronger size premium case.
- The valuation specialist may be able to use the rate of return implied in a past business
 combination of the subject entity to inform its risk assessment in a current fair value
 measurement.⁸
- The valuation specialist may be able to reference implied rates of return for similar acquired assets or companies.

299 Other Key Points

The Working Group cautions that it may not be appropriate to assume that market participants will always incorporate all economic benefits of control into the price paid for a controlling interest in a subject business, even if such benefits exist. In other words, market participants ordinarily do not give away all of their upside—the incremental economic benefits—that may arise from a transaction. How much of the upside is included in the transaction price depends, in part, on the competitive dynamics of the sale process.

⁸ Any analysis of rates of return implied by past business combinations should exclude the effect of buyerspecific synergies in the cash flows.

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306 Furthermore, the Working Group believes that it is incorrect to assume that the public market has 307 "underpriced" noncontrolling interests in the subject entity in measuring the magnitude of an 308 MPAP for a controlling interest. For example, stock analysts frequently publish price targets for 309 the shares of publicly traded companies. The existence of price targets in excess of the prevailing 310 stock price does not provide direct evidence of the MPAP. In such cases, the valuation specialist 311 should investigate the investment thesis underlying the price target. If the price target is premised 312 on the expectation that the company may soon be "in play" for a change of control transaction or 313 an expectation that a controlling interest buyer would implement strategies to increase the 314 economic benefits generated by the firm, such price targets may provide indirect support for an 315 MPAP. However, in most cases, the Working Group believes that analysts' price targets do not 316 reflect factors that are relevant to MPAP considerations.

BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCING MARKET PARTICIPANT ACQUISITION PREMIUM

317 As valuation specialists evaluate the potential economic benefits that may be derived by market 318 participants from exercising the prerogatives of control in a manner different from current 319 ownership, it is important to assess the reasonableness of the assumed economic benefits in the 320 context of the characteristics of the subject business enterprise and the industry in which it 321 operates. The following discussion is not intended to be comprehensive, but is representative of 322 the factors that valuation specialists should consider in estimating the price market participants 323 would pay for the subject controlling interest. The discussion is principles-based but the Working 324 Group acknowledges there may be exceptions based on the facts and circumstances of individual 325 cases.

326 Acquisition Activity in the Industry

The number of change of control transactions in a given industry fluctuates over time. When the frequency of transactions in an industry increases, it may signal that market participants perceive greater opportunities to generate economic benefits by exercising the prerogatives of control. For example, regulatory or other changes may favor a smaller number of larger industry players, prompting a round of consolidation. Alternatively, acquisition activity may increase because economic turmoil is causing the financially weaker members of the industry to seek to be acquired by more stable and less financially distressed companies.

Robust acquisition activity in the industry may increase the number of market participants that would contemplate acquiring a controlling interest in the subject entity. As a result, the selling shareholders may be able to realize greater economic benefits due to the increased number of bidding market participants, thereby increasing the MPAP.

In contrast, as a consolidation trend for an industry is confirmed by an increasing number of announced transactions, the fair value of noncontrolling interests in the subject entity may increase as investors come to expect that a change of control transaction on favorable terms is imminent. In such cases, the MPAP may be reduced as the difference between the fair value of controlling and noncontrolling interests is compressed.

343 Stage in Company Life Cycle

Growth-stage target companies generally offer greater opportunities for realizing economic benefits than more mature companies. For example, market participants may be able to leverage existing distribution networks that growth-stage companies have not yet had the opportunity or financial resources to develop, providing opportunities for superior revenue growth and/or enhanced operating margins. Mature target companies, on the other hand, are likely to present fewer opportunities for enhanced cash flows or lower cost of capital. As a result, the appropriate MPAP may be lower for such companies.

351 Market Participant Attributes

- 352 Market participants are commonly classified into three general categories:
- *Strategic acquirers* already operate in the same business as the subject entity. Revenue synergies and cost savings tend to be the most important economic benefits available to strategic acquirers exercising the prerogatives of control. Strategic acquirers may be competitors of, suppliers to, or customers of the subject entity.
- Financial acquirers do not have any existing complementary business operations. Financial acquirers, such as private equity funds, are less likely to identify significant revenue synergies or operating cost savings than strategic acquirers. Financial acquirers may possess
 financing advantages relative to strategic acquirers.
- *Conglomerate acquirers* are operating companies that acquire the subject entity to increase the diversification of the acquirer's existing revenues and cash flows. While there may be some administrative efficiencies that are expected to contribute to enhanced cash flows, the expectation of diversification benefits, and thus lower risk, causes the benefits available to conglomerate acquirers to more closely resemble financial rather than strategic acquirers.
- While this classification is helpful for evaluating the attributes of market participants and the nature and magnitude of economic benefits they will expect from owning control of the subject entity, the Working Group emphasizes that the boundaries between the categories are permeable. For example:
- Financial acquirers often acquire controlling interests in companies to "bolt on" to existing
 portfolio investments, thereby resembling strategic acquirers in many respects.
- Financial acquirers may anticipate significant cash flow enhancements from replacing what
 they perceive to be an underperforming management team, or from the eventual sale to a
 strategic acquirer, or through taking the entity public with favorable initial public offering
 pricing.
- Strategic or conglomerate acquirers may have access to financing arrangements on terms at
 least as favorable as financial acquirers.
- A decision to operate as a private company avoids the costs of public company compliance.
- 379 Valuation specialists should identify market participants' attributes and relate the expected 380 economic benefits of control to the likely strategies of such acquirers. In many cases, strategic, 381 financial, and conglomerate acquirers compete with one another for the same targets and the fair 382 value of controlling interests could appear to encompass a mix of strategic and financial benefits.

383 Size of Market Participants Relative to Subject Entity

384 Market participants are often larger than the subject entity. This is unsurprising, as larger 385 companies may be positioned to realize economic benefits that are not available to a smaller 386 company on a stand-alone basis. For example, other factors being equal, larger companies are 387 more likely to have favorable access to capital, existing distribution infrastructure and 388 administrative capacity, and superior negotiating leverage with suppliers and customers. As a 389 result, the larger market participants may be able to extract greater economic benefit from the 390 subject entity than the current owner(s)—and in a shorter period of time. As a result, the MPAP 391 may be positively related to the size of the market participants for the subject controlling interest.

Balance of Information

Market participants forecast the economic benefits to be realized from an acquisition on the basis of information discovered during due diligence procedures. Assuming the subject entity is a willing party to the selling process, the due diligence associated with acquisition of a controlling interest is likely to yield information not available to investors in noncontrolling interests in the subject entity. The Working Group has identified three varieties of information asymmetry that can influence the fair value of a controlling interest, and by extension, the MPAP, in certain circumstances:⁹

400 1. Information available to market participants for controlling interests, but not market 401 participants for noncontrolling interests. In general, the subject entity's Equity 402 Foundation reflects only publicly available information regarding the subject entity. 403 However, at the measurement date, there may be relevant information regarding the 404 results of operations or other factors that are disclosed to market participants for 405 controlling interests but not yet publicly disseminated. For example, if the measurement 406 date coincides with the end of the subject entity's reporting period, operating results for 407 the period are likely known by the company with a considerable degree of certainty 408 although the company may have issued only limited guidance to analysts and investors so 409 that the publicly traded share price does not reflect the information. The existence of nonpublic information favorable to the subject entity may support a larger MPAP; if the 410 411 nonpublic information is unfavorable, that may indicate a lower MPAP.

⁹ This discussion is in the context of publicly traded entities. For private companies, the Foundation value is not observable and so the application of information asymmetry is more difficult to measure as it relates to Foundation value.

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- 412 2. Information known to the subject entity but not market participants. If the information is 413 favorable to the subject entity, it is likely to be disclosed to the market participants during due diligence. Under the definition of fair value, market participants are assumed to be 414 "knowledgeable, have a reasonable understanding about the asset or liability and the 415 transaction based on all available information, including information that might be 416 417 obtained through due diligence efforts that are usual and customary."¹⁰ As a result, even if the subject entity would prefer that market participants not be aware of unfavorable 418 information, such information is assumed to be known in measuring fair value, resulting 419 420 in a comparatively lower MPAP. The Working Group believes favorable information 421 revealed to the market participants but not reflected in the Equity Foundation would 422 increase the MPAP.
- 423 3. Information known only to a single market participant, but not the subject entity. A 424 particular market participant might have information that enables them to take advantage 425 of unique revenue synergies or cost savings. If this information is truly known only to a 426 single market participant, the effect on the fair value of the subject controlling interest is likely to be modest as the market participant would be unwilling to pay more than the 427 value of the economic benefits available to the next most advantageously positioned 428 429 market participant. In other words, if such information is known only to a specific buyer, 430 the financial value impact resulting from this information should be excluded from the 431 estimation of fair value.¹¹

In considering information asymmetries, the valuation specialist should be careful to not double
count the impact of such items. The impact of some information asymmetries might already be
reflected in the typical inputs (i.e., cash flows and/or required rates of return).

The Working Group cautions that it can be difficult to support the existence and magnitude of most information asymmetries. Further, the degree to which the balance of information contributed to historically observed transaction premiums will, in most cases, be impossible to discern.

¹⁰ ASC 820-10-20.

¹¹ The working group recognizes there may be instances in which different market participants have access to different information that could result in similar financial value impact. These would be considered market participant synergies because in a competitive bidding situation they would likely be paid for.

439 Capital Structure of Subject Entity

Among the prerogatives of control is the ability to adjust the subject entity's capital structure. As discussed previously, shifting to a more optimal capital structure is one strategy for reducing the weighted average cost of capital. The farther the subject entity's capital structure is from the optimal financing mix, the greater the potential MPAP. The Working Group notes that in the application of invested capital market multiples, some aspect of this benefit may be already factored in because guideline companies typically have a more optimal capital structure.

446 Management Objectives

447 Privately held companies often are managed with objectives that differ from those of publicly 448 traded companies. This difference is not necessarily a matter of "quality" of management 449 (addressed in the next section), but instead might be a matter of differing goals. Such differences 450 might include above-market compensation paid to the private company owner, lease rates that do 451 not reflect market conditions, avoidance of the use of debt financing, net working capital at levels 452 above industry norms, and other similar factors.

453 Depending on how these factors are addressed in determining the Foundation value, the MPAP 454 for such a privately held company might exceed that measured for many publicly traded entities.

455 **Quality of Management**

Another prerogative of control is the ability to change the subject entity's management team. If the quality of the incumbent management team is perceived by market participants to be less than optimal, it may be more likely that strategies to enhance cash flows or reduce the cost of capital can be successfully implemented. Such strategies might contribute to a larger MPAP. Conversely, if market participants consider the existing management team to be of high quality, opportunities to realize further economic benefits are likely to be limited, resulting in a smaller MPAP.

While the notion of management quality is inherently subjective, objective metrics can provide insight regarding the effect of current management policies. Metrics such as growth, profitability, asset utilization, and cost of capital can be benchmarked against peer companies to provide insight regarding the quality of incumbent management. However, such measures must be interpreted in the context of the management team's tenure and firm-specific factors, such as contracts, facilities, and other assets that were inherited from prior management teams.

The Working Group observes that poor quality management is unlikely to be a factor cited in support of an MPAP since it rarely will be acknowledged by the management team responsible for the fair value measurement. Nonetheless, it is an important consideration and highlights the importance of comparative financial analysis when evaluating the economic benefits that may be available to market participants exercising control over a business enterprise.

474 **Regulatory Factors**

475 Regulatory factors can be significant considerations in business combinations. In addition,
476 regulatory factors can mitigate or amplify the degree of control exercised by a particular
477 ownership interest. Purchase prices and acquisition premiums in transactions outside the United
478 States can differ significantly from those inside the United States because of different regulatory
479 environments.

- 480 There are a variety of regulatory factors that may be relevant to the analysis of the MPAP:
- *Regulations governing merger and acquisition activity.* Some regulations, such as antitrust provisions designed to limit the potential for monopoly power, may directly affect which market participants are potential acquirers of the subject entity. Regulatory provisions that significantly reduce the number of potential bidders for the subject entity may have a dampening effect on the MPAP.
- *Limitations on foreign direct investment.* As with anti-trust provisions, those aimed at
 limiting the ability of foreign market participants to acquire a controlling interest in the
 subject entity may reduce the MPAP applicable to the subject entity.
- Investor protection measures. Investor protection measures such as uniform accounting standards and corporate securities laws are generally designed to protect noncontrolling investors. Some measures may even grant noncontrolling shareholders in a business enterprise the right to block the controlling owner's ability to unilaterally exercise certain prerogatives of control. Since the MPAP measures the difference between the fair value of controlling and noncontrolling interests, regulations that increase the fair value of noncontrolling interests will, all else being equal, reduce the MPAP.
- Industry-specific regulations. Some industries, such as banking and telecommunications, are governed by a host of industry-specific regulations that govern the conduct of, and competition among, firms within the industry. Such industry regulations can shift with economic conditions and the political environment. Industry-specific regulations that are perceived to promote consolidation activity may increase the MPAP. If, instead, the prevailing regulatory stance is one of limiting acquisition activity, the MPAP may be lower.
- 502 The influence of regulatory factors should be evaluated relative to observed transaction activity 503 in the subject entity's industry.

504 Corporate Bylaws and Governing Documents

505 Valuation specialists should consult the subject entity's corporate bylaws and other governing 506 documents to determine whether there are any provisions that may restrict the ability of the 507 subject interest to exercise control over the business enterprise.

508 The Working Group believes it is a mistake to conceive of control as being absolute; rather, 509 control of the enterprise should be evaluated along a continuum extending from substantial 510 minority investments to complete ownership of all equity share classes. For example, the subject 511 entity's governing documents may grant preferred shareholders the right to vote as a class on 512 certain corporate actions, or to elect a certain number of corporate directors. In other cases, a 513 supermajority vote of the common shares may be required to approve a sale of the business.

514 Some companies issue both voting and nonvoting shares with the economic rights of the 515 nonvoting shares being identical to the voting shares. Observed differences between trading 516 prices for noncontrolling interests in the two share classes are typically very small. Because this 517 is based on a comparison of the prices of noncontrolling interests, such data is of little use in the 518 analysis of MPAP.

5

519 **Transaction Structure**

520 The structure of a transaction can exert a significant influence on the nominal price paid for a 521 controlling interest. The tax characteristics of a transaction, including the availability of 522 amortization benefits to the market participants, can affect the purchase price. ASC 350 requires

523 consideration of whether fair value reflects a taxable or nontaxable transaction structure.

524 Controlling interest acquisitions often include contingent consideration arrangements. Depending

525 on how the contingent consideration is measured, the nominal purchase price may be overstated 526 or understated.¹²

527 Valuation specialists should carefully consider the influence of transaction structure on both 528 observed transaction multiples and control premiums, as well as fair value measurement of the 529 subject controlling interest. Unfortunately, important details that would permit careful analysis of

530 closed transactions are usually unavailable to the valuation specialist.

531 Summary

In summary, the Working Group believes this section illustrates many of the factors that 532 533 valuation specialists would consider in estimating the price market participants are willing to pay 534 for the subject controlling interest. The preceding listing and discussion of business 535 characteristics and considerations is not intended to capture all factors that may influence an 536 MPAP. Instead, the Working Group focused on topics that, based on its collective professional 537 experiences, are encountered most often in practice. Consideration of these concepts may be helpful when performing original analysis to develop an MPAP. These concepts may also be 538 539 useful in assessing the reasonableness of another party's MPAP analysis, such as in a peer or 540 specialist review context.

¹² The Working Group notes that contingent consideration arrangements are less common in acquisitions of public companies (the basis for observed transaction premiums).

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541 Conclusions

A well-supported fair value measurement for a controlling interest in a business enterprise should include consideration, from the market participants' perspective, of the incremental economic benefits of control. The prerogatives of control may lead to economic benefits in many areas and the valuation specialist should review the typical business characteristics likely to influence the magnitude of the benefits available to market participants.

547 The Working Group believes that use of the framework discussed will provide an important 548 context for review of the valuation results, and will increase the relevance and reliability of the 549 associated fair value measurement.

ANALYTICAL METHODS

550 The remaining sections of this VFR Advisory address some of the important analytical methods 551 involved in expressing MPAPs, analyzing observed premiums from historical transactions, and 552 assessing the reasonableness of the concluded MPAP.

553 Expressing the Market Participant Acquisition Premium

- Although the MPAP may be expressed as a dollar amount (the difference between the *pro rata* fair value of a controlling interest and its Foundation), valuation specialists customarily express valuation premiums and discounts as the percentage difference. This is intuitive and facilitates the comparison of premiums across companies of different sizes.
- Valuation specialists have traditionally used the Equity Foundation to calculate the transaction premium as a percentage. This is consistent with the methodology for reporting premiums used by FactSet Mergerstat[®], LLC, which the Working Group observes (based on its experience) to be the most widely cited source of historical control premium data. It is also consistent with the way in which premiums are commonly reported in the financial press.
- 563 In deliberating the MPAP, the Working Group concluded that the traditional method of 564 calculating transaction premiums is potentially misleading. Specifically, the economic benefits 565 realized through exercising the prerogatives of control enhance the fair value of the enterprise as 566 a whole, not just the fair value of the equity.¹³

567 Further, expressing the MPAP as a percentage of the Equity Foundation distorts the 568 comparability of the MPAP among companies with different capital structures. For example, 569 assume Foundation TIC value for both Company A and Company B is \$100 million. Company A 570 has \$10 million of interest-bearing debt outstanding and Company B has \$50 million of interest-571 bearing debt outstanding. Assume further that, from the perspective of market participants, the 572 magnitude of economic benefits from exercising the prerogatives of control for Company A is 573 identical to that for Company B, such that the MPAP applicable to each company is \$20 million.

¹³ When there is a change of control transaction, the debt typically is due at its face amount, which approximates or equals fair value.

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As shown in the following table, the traditional method of expressing the premium as a percentage of the Equity Foundation will cause the MPAP for Company A to appear smaller than that of Company B. However, when expressed as a percentage of the TIC Foundation, the MPAPs—which are economically equivalent (the same dollar amount)—are identical.

	Company A	<u>Company B</u>
Fair Value of Interest-Bearing Debt	\$10.0	\$50.0
Fair Value of Equity	<u>90.0</u>	<u>50.0</u>
Fair Value of Total Invested Catpial	\$100.0	\$100.0
(Marketable, Noncontrolling Interest Basis)		
Fair Value of Total Invested Capital	\$120.0	\$120.0
(Controlling Interest Basis)		
Market Participant Acquisition Premium	\$20.0	\$20.0
Traditional Method		
Market Participant Acquisition Premium	\$20.0	\$20.0
Fair Value of Equity	\$90.0	\$50.0
(Marketable, Noncontrolling Interest Basis)		
Market Participant Acquisition Premium (%)	22.2%	40.0%
Total Invested Capital Method		
Market Participant Acquisition Premium	\$20.0	\$20.0
Fair Value of Total Invested Capital	\$100.0	\$100.0
(Marketable, Noncontrolling Interest Basis)		
Market Participant Acquisition Premium (%)	20.0%	20.0%

578 The Working Group believes that best practices include expressing as well as applying the MPAP in the context of a TIC Foundation.¹⁴ The Working Group acknowledges that following 579 580 this best practice will require the restatement of observed transaction premiums that have been 581 traditionally expressed based on an Equity Foundation. Nonetheless, the Working Group believes 582 that the benefits of doing so (alignment with the underlying economic benefits giving rise to the 583 MPAP and greater comparability across firms with different capital structures) outweigh the 584 incremental effort. Since the observed transaction premiums relate to publicly traded companies, 585 the information is ordinarily available to enable expression of the observed transaction premiums 586 using a TIC Foundation.

¹⁴ Concepts of TIC level premiums may not be applicable for certain industries (e.g., certain types of financial services entities).

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587 Analyzing Historical Premium and Transaction Data

588 Transactions in which the buyer acquires a controlling interest in a publicly traded company afford opportunities to observe the magnitude of transaction premiums paid by acquirers. 589 590 Valuation specialists often reference observed premiums when estimating or supporting the 591 MPAP for the subject entity. Although similar transaction premiums presumably also exist in the 592 acquisition of private companies, the absence of an observable Foundation price for the acquired 593 company precludes calculating reliable premiums. However, such transactions may vield reliable 594 multiples of revenue, earnings measures, or other relevant metrics that are indicative of the fair 595 value of a controlling interest.

596 The Working Group cautions that exclusive reliance on observed transaction premium data 597 provides, in most cases, insufficient support for a concluded MPAP. Nonetheless, observed 598 transaction premium data may be valuable. The Working Group believes that observed historical 599 premiums provide potentially relevant (albeit indirect) evidence of the appropriate magnitude of 600 the incremental economic benefits anticipated by market participants. The observed premiums 601 can be used to corroborate (or question) the reasonableness of the cash flow forecasts and 602 discount rates underlying fair value measurements within the income approach. However, 603 exclusive reliance on observed transaction premiums without careful analysis of the subject 604 entity's relative financial performance, valuation multiples, and other metrics can result in an unreliable fair value measurement. 605

The valuation specialist may consider the qualitative factors discussed in the earlier section— *Business Characteristics Influencing Market Participant Acquisition Premium*—to narrow the range of observed premiums from the transaction data that may be applicable for the subject entity. Analysis of these factors may also support the incremental benefits assumed in a quantitative analysis of the MPAP.

611 Assessing the Underlying Data Set – Transaction Data

612 Valuation specialists should carefully analyze available transaction data and consider various 613 factors specific to the acquired company, the seller, the acquirer, or the transaction that may 614 warrant adjustments to the data. Factors valuation specialists should consider include the 615 following:

- Size of Interest Transacted. The valuation specialists should attempt to ascertain whether the
 interest transacted represents 100 percent ownership of the company. As discussed
 previously, there is a continuum of control, and ownership interests of less than 100 percent
 may not be able to unilaterally exercise the prerogatives of control.
- *Financial Condition of Seller*. Transactions involving sellers motivated by financial distress
 or bankruptcy usually do not provide reliable evidence for fair value measurement.

- *Relationship of Buyer and Seller*. If the parties to the transaction have some pre-existing
 relationship, it may indicate that the transaction terms do not reflect arm's-length negotiation,
 which would limit the usefulness of the transaction data when measuring fair value.
- *Stated Rationale for Transaction.* When available, analysts should review press releases and other corporate announcements describing the transaction to determine if the price paid (and therefore the multiples and premiums observed) reflected any buyer-specific synergies or other characteristics that render the transaction data unsuitable for use in a fair value measurement.
- *Changes in Market Conditions.* Unlike guideline public company data, guideline transaction data rarely lines up with the measurement date. Rather, some amount of time will have elapsed between the occurrence of the observed transaction and the measurement date. Depending on the length of the time gap, analysis of changes in market, economic or industry conditions (as reflected in pertinent market indices or economic series) between the two dates may be appropriate to assess the relevance of the observed transaction data to the fair value measurement.
- Stock Price and Volume Fluctuations Prior to Announcement. In some cases, the stock of the target company may exhibit unusual volatility and/or increased trading volume prior to the formal announcement of the transaction. The existence of such phenomena may indicate that the implied acquisition premium should be calculated with reference to an earlier, unaffected, stock price.
- *Transaction Structure*. Especially for transactions involving private companies, an array of transaction structure concerns can distort the reported data. For example:
- o Acquirers may purchase either the stock or the assets of the target company.
- 645 Certain corporate assets such as cash or real estate may not be included in the transaction.
- o The consideration may include a note bearing interest at a rate other than market.
- 647 o The fair value of contingent consideration arrangements is often difficult to measure at the transaction date (and may be excluded altogether from a reported price).
- *Transaction Process.* The valuation analyst should endeavor to ascertain whether the transaction was the culmination of a deliberate selling and marketing effort administered by competent investment bankers, a hostile takeover, a bidding war, or negotiation with a single acquirer.
- *Transaction Status*. Referenced transactions may have been announced, but not yet closed at the measurement date. In such cases, valuation specialists should carefully consider how much weight to give to such transactions.

656 Given the limited availability of data regarding most change of control transactions, it is unlikely 657 that valuation specialists will be able to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the factors 658 described above for each transaction relied on. Nonetheless, by considering these factors, 659 valuation specialists might be able to exclude transaction data that is misleading for the subject 660 fair value measurement.

661 **Other Considerations – Historical Premium Data**

Available data regarding observed premiums in historical transactions present additionalchallenges for valuation specialists.

In many cases, there will be a trade-off between the quantity of available premium data and the quality of the data (in other words, the data's relevance to the fair value measurement). Valuation specialists should evaluate the relevance of referenced premium data by considering the degree to which the target company is comparable to the subject entity, and whether the acquirer is representative of market participants for the subject entity at the measurement date.

669 The number of referenced transactions can be increased by considering those occurring during a 670 longer period of time preceding the measurement date. However, transactions more proximate to 671 the measurement date are generally preferable, especially when consolidation trends within the 672 subject entity's industry have evolved. When evidence from transactions near the measurement 673 date is limited or not available, valuation specialists may wish to consider industry premiums 674 over a longer period, such as one, three, or five years prior to the measurement date. However, 675 when doing so, valuation specialists should be careful to consider what effect, if any, changes in 676 economic, market, or industry factors may have had on the level of observed premiums over the 677 period analyzed.

678 The reported magnitude of the observed premium from a transaction is affected by the date 679 selected to serve as the basis for expressing the premium (the date of the Foundation price). 680 Valuation specialists should review the target company's public share trading volume and price fluctuations for the weeks leading up to the transaction announcement date to identify any 681 682 unusual or unexplained market activity. For example, if the target company had retained a 683 financial advisor to explore strategic alternatives, or negotiations with potential acquirers are 684 known to the public, it is preferable to calculate the transaction premium using a price from a 685 date before such information began to be incorporated into the target company's publicly traded 686 stock price.

687 Valuation specialists routinely consider premiums implied by the difference in the transaction 688 price (on the announcement date) to the traded price from one to 30 days prior to the 689 announcement of the transaction. Valuation specialists may also calculate transaction premiums 690 based on the average stock price over a period. The Working Group believes that, if applied 691 consistently, such techniques can be used to improve the relevance and reliability of historical 692 premium data.

693 Limitations Inherent in Observed Premium and Transaction Data

As noted in the previous sections of this VFR Advisory, valuation specialists considering observed premium and transaction data must be vigilant to ensure that the data has been evaluated for comparability and relevance to the subject entity.

697 Beyond these issues, valuation specialists should be aware of more fundamental concerns that 698 may limit the usefulness of such data when measuring the fair value of a controlling interest, 699 such as:

- 700 Selection bias. Acquisition premiums and other transaction data may be subject to selection • 701 bias since the population of observed transactions is limited to those companies that have 702 been acquired. Some valuation specialists emphasize that such companies typically represent 703 only a small portion of the universe of companies available to be acquired. While not subject to empirical verification, one potential conclusion from this observation is that the control 704 705 value of the much larger population of companies not acquired is not greater than the 706 companies' market capitalization because any incremental economic benefits would not be 707 sufficient to induce an acquirer to seek control.
- 708 In any case, since the premiums and transaction multiples applicable to the companies not 709 acquired cannot be observed, application of observed premiums or implied transaction 710 multiples to the subject entity may introduce an upward bias in the resulting fair value measurement. Stated alternatively, transaction data may be drawn from a sample limited to 711 712 those companies for which the premiums would be highest. As a result, the valuation 713 specialist must carefully assess whether the subject entity is comparable to acquired 714 companies in the sample. The valuation specialist may consider the qualitative factors 715 discussed in the earlier section-Business Characteristics Influencing Market Participant 716 Acquisition Premium—to identify the most relevant observed premiums from the transaction 717 data that may be appropriate for the subject entity.
- Acquirer-specific synergies. Setting aside the potential for selection bias, data from closed 718 transactions may reflect acquirer-specific synergies that are not available to the relevant pool 719 720 of market participants. Specific synergies that are not available to market participants are 721 excluded from the definition of fair value. In most cases, the specific considerations 722 motivating the parties to the transaction cannot reliably be discerned from the available 723 transaction data. As a result, it is difficult for valuation specialists to precisely determine the 724 degree to which the observed premiums and transaction multiples are relevant when 725 measuring the fair value of the subject controlling interest.

Negative observed transaction premiums. Referenced sources of transaction premium data 726 727 often include negative premiums. Negative transaction premiums are observed when the 728 price per share paid for a controlling interest is less than the contemporaneous Foundation 729 price. The Working Group believes that negative observed transaction premiums should be 730 disregarded when measuring fair value. The Working Group believes that, absent anomalous 731 circumstances with respect to either the market for the subject entity's shares or the 732 transaction process for the controlling interest (neither of which would be relevant in 733 measuring fair value), market participants would be unwilling to sell to a controlling interest 734 acquirer at a price less than the Foundation price.

Each of these concerns underscores the importance of careful analysis of the incremental economic benefits available to market participants through exercising the prerogatives of control in a manner different from the prior owners. The Working Group affirms the value of identifying and referencing observed historical transaction premiums and other transaction data; however, exclusive reliance on such data is not consistent with best practices for fair value measurement.

740 Assessing the Reasonableness of the Concluded Market Participant Acquisition 741 Premium

A credible fair value measurement should include an assessment of the overall reasonableness of the measurement, including the MPAP applied or implied by the analysis. While premiums are conventionally expressed as a percentage of the Equity Foundation, or in some cases the TIC Foundation, the Working Group believes that the overall reasonableness of the fair value measurement should be assessed more broadly.

747 Defined as the difference between two measures of fair value (the controlling interest and 748 Foundation), the MPAP is—strictly speaking—a byproduct of the valuation process rather than 749 an exogenous input. While valuation specialists commonly estimate the MPAP as an input in 750 measuring the fair value of a controlling interest (when using the guideline public company 751 method, for example), the level of rigor of analysis would depend on the importance of the 752 MPAP to the fair value measurement.¹⁵ Valuation specialists may consider using the following 753 techniques to evaluate the reasonableness of the fair value measurement of a controlling interest 754 in a business enterprise:

Relative value measures. When feasible, valuation specialists should calculate ratios of total invested capital to relevant performance measures, such as revenue; Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA); or other industry-relevant metrics. When an MPAP has been added to a Foundation value, comparison of the resulting relative value measures to transaction multiples observed from the available transaction data might assist the valuation specialist in confirming the reasonableness of the selected premium.

¹⁵ The Working Group believes that the discounted cash flow method (when using market participant cash flows and discount rates) and the guideline transaction method yield controlling interest indications; in such cases, application of a discrete market participant acquisition premium is inappropriate.

• *Prospective Return Analysis.* The MPAP is a function of the incremental economic benefits anticipated by market participants from exercising the prerogatives of control. If the guideline public company approach is the primary method used in measuring fair value, the valuation specialist might consider also using a discounted cash flow approach and calculating the discount rate implied by the effective earnings multiple. Comparing the implied discount rate to the weighted average cost of capital for market participants can help confirm the reasonableness of the MPAP.

- 768 *Calibration to prior transactions in the subject entity.* In some instances, transactions for debt 769 or equity interests in the subject entity will have occurred during a relevant period of time 770 leading up to the measurement date. Market transactions may include those involving the 771 subject controlling interest, a noncontrolling interest in the subject entity, or other debt or 772 equity securities of the subject entity. The valuation specialist should carefully assess whether 773 the market transactions were arm's-length and orderly, and if so, calibrate the fair value 774 measurement to the terms of the market transaction, taking into account changes in the 775 market since the transaction and fundamental differences between the subject controlling 776 interest and the interest transacted.
- 777 *Comparison to public market capitalization.* When measuring the fair value of reporting units 778 of public companies, the Working Group believes that the concluded aggregate fair value of 779 the reporting units (on a controlling interest basis) should be compared to the market 780 capitalization of the company on the measurement date. The MPAP for the entire company 781 implied by such a comparison might be a barometer of the overall reasonableness of the fair 782 value measurement. However, there are cases in which there would reasonably be a 783 difference between the aggregate control value of the reporting units and the control value of 784 the total company, such as a conglomerate for which the parts might be worth more or less 785 than the whole or a company whose shares are not actively traded.

786 Valuation specialists may consider myriad value indications when several valuation 787 methodologies are available and relevant for consideration in appraising a single valuation 788 subject. ASC 350-20-35-22 states that "the market price of an individual equity security (and 789 thus the market capitalization of a reporting unit with publicly traded equity securities) may not be representative of the fair value of the reporting unit as a whole." ASC 350-20-35-23 further 790 791 states that "measuring the fair value of a collection of assets and liabilities that operate together 792 in a controlled entity is different from measuring the fair value of that entity's individual equity 793 securities . . . [t]he quoted market price of an individual equity security, therefore, need not be 794 the sole measurement basis of the fair value of a reporting unit."

- 795 However, when the fair value of reporting units are estimated for ASC 350 purposes, whether for 796 entities with one or several reporting units, the entity's market capitalization has been commonly 797 referenced as indirect value evidence even in cases where the unit of account prescribed by ASC 798 350 (i.e., the reporting unit) may be different from the quoted unit of measurement (i.e., the 799 individual shares of the entity). In the case of multiple reporting units, additional adjustments 800 have been made to present the best apples-to-apples comparison. In other words, the strength of 801 quoted evidence was compelling enough to consider even with an understanding that the quoted 802 price was not necessarily directly linked to the valuation subject.
- 803 In 2008, during the economic crisis, the market for and fair value of many assets and companies 804 declined and the level of difficulty for measuring value increased. At the 2008 AICPA National 805 Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments, the SEC Staff offered its view of how 806 market capitalization may be used when assessing goodwill impairment. In particular, the SEC 807 staff indicated that they would expect objective evidence to support the reasonableness of implied transaction premiums, whether a quantitative or qualitative analysis (or both) was used. 808 809 The SEC staff also indicated that while judgment may result in a range of reasonably possible 810 premiums, they expect the rigor of documentation to increase as the magnitude of the premium 811 increases.¹⁶
- 812 Whereas the practice of referencing market capitalization was in place before the 2008 SEC speech, the Working Group believes the SEC staff's views increased the usage of the market 813 814 capitalization reconciliation and it became more prevalent in audits of such entities. Since that 815 time, the FASB issued FASB ASU 2011-08. In the Basis for Conclusions in that document, the 816 FASB noted that the use of the qualitative screen will result in companies applying judgment on 817 when and how to perform the market capitalization reconciliation.¹⁷ Notwithstanding the 818 potential difficulty, the Working Group believes it is a best practice to perform an analysis of the 819 conclusion relative to the market capitalization.

In most cases, for publicly traded entities, it would be beneficial to perform a comparison of the estimated fair values of the reporting units in aggregate with the entity's market capitalization and analyze the implied MPAP, if any. In such cases, the reasonableness of the implied MPAP should be supported through quantitative and qualitative analyses. The rigor of the supporting analyses and documentation will depend upon the magnitude of the implied control premiums, particularly if the implied MPAP affects the conclusion regarding whether the reporting unit is impaired.

¹⁶ Robert G. Fox III, "Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks before the 2008 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments," December 8, 2008, transcript, https://www.sec.gov/ news/speech/2008/spch120808rgf.htm.

¹⁷ "BC34. The Board recognizes that many public entities reconcile the sum of the fair values of each reporting unit to the entity's market capitalization. The Board acknowledged that the amendments in this Update may result in entities applying more judgment about when and how to perform this evaluation; however, it concluded that this factor should not prohibit an entity from utilizing the qualitative assessment."

827 The majority of the implied premium will likely be supported through the enhancement in cash 828 flows or reduction in risk (or both), as discussed previously. The illustrative examples presented 829 in a subsequent section of this VFR Advisory provide a potential quantitative framework that 830 may be considered to support the implied premium. Additionally, the qualitative factors 831 discussed in the earlier section—Business Characteristics Influencing Market Participant 832 Acquisition Premium—may be considered to support the implied MPAP relative to the range of 833 observed premiums from the transaction data that may be applicable for the subject entity. In 834 certain situations, albeit rare, what appears to be an implied MPAP may result from transactions 835 in the company's stock that are not orderly (e.g., a distressed sale).¹⁸ This would render the 836 comparison between the market capitalization and the estimated fair value to be not very 837 meaningful.

The Working Group believes that use of techniques like those described above is a vital part of measuring the fair value of controlling interests in business enterprises. These tests of reasonableness allow the valuation specialist to demonstrate to auditors, regulators, and other interested parties that the MPAP is grounded in identifiable incremental economic benefits available to the relevant pool of market participants, thereby increasing the relevance and reliability of the associated fair value measurement.

This Advisory includes an illustrative example for analyzing MPAPs (see *Selecting and Assessing Market Participant Acquisition Premiums—Example*; a subsequent section of this paper located on page 42).

¹⁸ ASC 820-10-35-54D.

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THE FAIR VALUE CONTEXT

847 Valuation is context dependent. Valuation specialists refer to standards of value to define the 848 relevant context for valuation. The objective of this Working Group is to develop best practices 849 for the valuation of controlling interests in business enterprises under the standard of fair value 850 for financial reporting. The following sections of this VFR Advisory provide commentary on the 851 definition of fair value and identify the most common instances in financial reporting requiring 852 measurement of the fair value of controlling interests in business enterprises.

853 **The Fair Value Definition**

ASC 820, *Fair Value Measurement* (ASC 820) defines fair value (in its glossary) as "[t]he price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date."

The definition of fair value and associated guidance create a unique lens through which to view the valuation of controlling interests in business enterprises. A comprehensive and detailed review of the fair value definition is beyond the scope of this VFR Advisory and readers are assumed to have a basic understanding of the standard. However, given the fundamental significance of fair value to the subject of this VFR Advisory, it is important to briefly review a number of key fair value concepts.

863 Exit Price

Fair value is defined as the price received to sell an asset; in other words, fair value is an exit price from the perspective of a market participant holding the asset. In contrast, an entry price would be the price paid to acquire an asset. Despite the conceptual distinction, entry and exit prices for a subject controlling interest in a business enterprise may often be indistinguishable. Nonetheless, valuation specialists should acknowledge that the objective of a fair value measurement is to determine the exit price as of the measurement date and be alert for situations in which the exit and entry prices may differ.

871 Principal (or Most Advantageous) Market

According to ASC 820, the assumed transaction underlying the fair value measurement occurs in the principal market for the subject asset. The principal market is the market with the greatest volume and level of activity for the asset. Further, the principal market is one to which the reporting entity has access at the measurement date. In the absence of a principal market, ASC 820 specifies that fair value should be measured as the price in the market in which the price received to sell the subject asset is maximized (the most advantageous market).

With respect to controlling interests in business enterprises, the Working Group believes that the principal market is that for mergers and acquisitions, in which strategic, financial, and conglomerate buyers evaluate controlling interests in business enterprises considering the economic benefits expected from ownership of such interests in the context of the perceived risk and expected rewards of the investment.

883 Market Participants

ASC 820 defines market participants as buyers and sellers in the principal (or most advantageous) market for the subject asset. First, market participants are assumed to possess sufficient knowledge regarding the subject asset. In other words, market participants are competent to assess and understand information regarding the subject asset that would be obtained through usual and customary due diligence. This attribute of market participants also implies that the subject asset has had appropriate exposure to the relevant market.

Second, market participants have the ability and/or financial wherewithal to engage in a transaction involving the subject asset. In other words, market participants are not subject to external financial constraints that would impinge upon their ability to purchase the subject asset. Market participants are, however, subject to the internal financial constraint of rational economic behavior and the requirement that expected return be commensurate with perceived risk. Finally, market participants are willing to transact for the subject asset. Market participants are motivated to transact by potential financial returns, but are not under any external compulsion or force.

Fair value is to be measured from the perspective of market participants, and valuation inputs observed directly from the behavior of market participants are given greater weight than those that are unobservable. Even when specifying unobservable inputs, valuation specialists are required by the guidance in ASC 820 to make assumptions consistent with the assumptions market participants would make, not necessarily those of the reporting entity.

902 The Working Group elected to introduce the MPAP in this VFR Advisory, in part, to emphasize 903 the importance of market participants' perspectives when measuring the fair value of a 904 controlling interest in a business enterprise.

905 Highest and Best Use

906 The fair value of nonfinancial assets (such as controlling interests in business enterprises) is 907 measured with respect to the highest and best use of the assets; for business enterprises, the 908 highest and best use of the underlying assets is evaluated from the perspective of market 909 participants. ASC 820 states that the value of nonfinancial assets may be maximized by their use 910 (1) in conjunction with other assets and liabilities (previously referred to as the "in use" valuation 911 premise), or (2) on a stand-alone basis (previously referred to as the "in exchange" valuation 912 premise).¹⁹ ASC 820 stipulates that, when measuring the fair value of a nonfinancial asset, the 913 asset's highest and best use should be evaluated from the market participants' perspective, even 914 if such use differs from that intended by the reporting entity. The assumed highest and best use of 915 the asset should be physically possible, legally permissible, and financially feasible.

916 Asset Characteristics

Fair value measurement should incorporate those characteristics of the subject asset that market participants would consider in valuing the asset, such as condition and location. With respect to an ownership interest in a business enterprise, the degree of control vested in the interest is a relevant characteristic that would be considered by market participants and should, therefore, be reflected when measuring fair value. Transaction costs are not characteristics of the subject asset and, hence, should not be considered when measuring fair value, although transactions costs are considered when identifying the most advantageous market.

ASC 820 clarifies, however, that entity-specific assumptions that are not consistent with the market participants' perspective are not relevant to fair value measurement.

926 Fair Value Measurements of Controlling Interests in Business Enterprises

As noted in the previous section, the relevance of a valuation adjustment such as the MPAP in measuring fair value is determined by the characteristics of the subject asset that would be considered by market participants in valuing the asset. The boundaries of the subject asset are delineated with respect to the unit of account, defined in ASC 820 (the glossary) as "the level at which an asset or liability is aggregated or disaggregated in a Topic for recognition purposes."

932 Three instances have been identified where the value of a controlling interest might need to be 933 estimated: goodwill impairment testing; portfolio valuation; and accounting for business 934 combinations in step acquisitions (Step Transactions).

¹⁹ ASU 2011-04 clarifies that the concepts of "highest and best use" and "valuation premise" do not apply to financial assets or liabilities.

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935 Goodwill Impairment Testing

The Working Group observes that goodwill impairment testing is the most common fair value 936 937 measurement on a controlling interest basis. ASC 350 provides guidance regarding periodic 938 goodwill impairment testing. The unit of account for such testing is the reporting unit, which is 939 defined as an operating segment or one level below an operating segment (i.e., a component). 940 Consistent with the unit of account, ASC 350 acknowledges that the fair value of a controlling 941 interest in a reporting unit may exceed the Foundation. ASC 350 explicitly acknowledges the 942 relevance of valuation premiums when measuring the fair value of reporting units. Using the 943 terminology adopted in this VFR Advisory, an MPAP may be appropriate when measuring the fair value of a reporting unit. ASC 350 states: 944

945 Substantial value may arise from the ability to take advantage of synergies and other benefits 946 that flow from control over another entity. Consequently, measuring the fair value of a 947 collection of assets and liabilities that operate together in a controlled entity is different from 948 measuring the fair value of that entity's individual equity securities. An acquiring entity often 949 is willing to pay more for equity securities that give it a controlling interest than an investor 950 would pay for a number of equity securities representing less than a controlling interest. That 951 control premium may cause the fair value of a reporting unit to exceed its market 952 capitalization. The quoted market price of an individual equity security, therefore, need not 953 be the sole measurement basis of the fair value of a reporting unit.

954 **Portfolio Valuation**

955 Investment companies such as private equity funds, hedge funds, and venture capital funds are 956 generally required to report the fair value of investment holdings in accordance with ASC 946, 957 Investment Companies (ASC 946). The funds of these companies often own assets that would be 958 valued using Level 2 or Level 3 inputs under the fair value hierarchy established by ASC 820 959 because current market prices are not readily available. Due to the often complex ownership 960 structures of the underlying companies as well as relationships among the investors, the Working 961 Group believes that understanding control and the related effect on fair value can be particularly 962 challenging for these investments.

At the date of this writing, the AICPA Private Equity/Venture Capital Task Force was developing a guide for investment companies.²⁰ It is the Working Group's understanding that issues related to control and MPAP for these situations will be discussed, and it is recommended that readers monitor the development of this guide.

967 Acquisition Method for Step Acquisitions

968 In certain transactions, control is gained and business combination accounting is required, but 969 some portion of the target equity is not acquired by the new controlling owner on the acquisition

²⁰ Valuation of Portfolio Company Investments of Venture Capital, Private Equity Funds and other Investment Companies.

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970 date. ASC 805 prescribes the accounting treatment for business combinations achieved in stages 971 (referred to as step acquisitions), as well as for partial acquisitions where control is gained. For 972 such transactions, the relevant guidance requires the acquirer to measure all of the identifiable 973 assets and liabilities of the target, any noncontrolling interest in the target that remains in the 974 hands of the other owners, and any previously held equity interest.

For example, if in the initial step of the transaction the acquirer purchases 60 percent of the outstanding shares of the target, the acquirer is required to measure the fair value of the noncontrolling interest held by others (the 40 percent interest not acquired). The fair value of the noncontrolling interest affects the amount of goodwill (or gain from bargain purchase) at the acquisition date.

980 When a noncontrolling interest is present in a transaction, the fair value of that interest may 981 reflect a potential reduction in value from the pro rata share of the value of the business on a 982 controlling interest basis. As noted in ASC 805: "The acquirer usually is the combining entity 983 that pays a premium over the pre-combination fair value of the equity interests of the other 984 combining entity or entities." If the market participants for the noncontrolling interest are not 985 expected to have access to the full range of incremental economic benefits anticipated by the 986 controlling interest acquirer, the fair value of the noncontrolling interest should reflect the 987 associated decrement to value. If applicable, incremental return requirements for market 988 participants evaluating a noncontrolling interest would likewise be expected to reduce the fair 989 value of the noncontrolling interest.²¹

Whether the fair value of the noncontrolling shares is measured directly through a valuation model or through adjustment of the indicated fair value of the controlling interest acquired in the transaction, the difference between the two fair value measurements should be supported following the best practices for MPAPs set forth in this VFR Advisory.

994 We note that in most cases the improvements to a business that are expected to be made by the 995 controlling shareholder will also benefit the noncontrolling interest. Therefore, it is common that 996 upon change of control, no value differential arising from control-related issues exists between 997 controlling and noncontrolling interests. However, certain less common circumstances may arise 998 that do create such a differential. Some examples of this follow. Acquisition synergies flowing to 999 an acquirer's legacy operations where the noncontrolling interest represents an interest in the 1000 newly acquired operations only, such that the noncontrolling interest will not participate in the 1001 value enhancements to the legacy assets. And clearly, if the noncontrolling interest shares have 1002 features that are different from the controlling interest shares, this may also create a value 1003 differential. Also, while full discussion of the topic is not within the scope of this VFR Advisory, 1004 we note for clarity that there is a potential for valuation differential between the noncontrolling 1005 and controlling interests due to differences in marketability.

²¹ The Working Group notes that if the pro rata fair value of the noncontrolling interest differs from the pro rata value of the controlling interest, the sum of the two positions will be less than 100 percent of the enterprise value. In other words, the decrement to the fair value of the noncontrolling interest does not accrue to the benefit of the controlling interest.

<u>SELECTING AND ASSESSING MARKET PARTICIPANT ACQUISITION</u> <u>PREMIUMS – EXAMPLES</u>

1006 The following examples are provided to illustrate best practices in both estimating MPAPs and 1007 reviewing the reasonableness of MPAPs implied by a fair value measurement in accordance with 1008 ASC 820.²² The level of analytical detail appropriate to support a given fair value measurement, 1009 and any related MPAP, is a matter of judgment and should be selected with regard to factors 1010 relevant for the accounting measurement under consideration. Relevant factors for consideration 1011 under ASC 350, goodwill impairment testing, would include:

- The magnitude of the premium implied by comparison of the fair value and the market 1013 capitalization (for publicly traded entities). The Working Group believes the higher the 1014 implied premium, the higher level of supporting analysis required.
- The magnitude of the difference between the fair value measurement and the carrying value of the reporting unit. Larger "cushions" between carrying value and fair value will generally require less analytical support for the MPAP (whether implied or directly applied). On the other hand, smaller cushions will generally result in greater scrutiny, indicating that more analytical detail is appropriate. In cases in which impairment would be indicated but for the MPAP, valuation specialists should anticipate that auditors will require the most substantive support of the MPAP.
- The magnitude of the premium implied by the difference between the indicated value under the discounted cash flow method (using market participants' control level cash flows) and the indicated value under the guideline public company method (prior to application of an MPAP). The greater the implied premium, the more detailed the procedures required to substantiate the implied premium.

1027 The following examples address two similar fact patterns related to a Step 1 goodwill impairment 1028 test. The first addresses a case in which the MPAP included is critical to the pass/fail result of the 1029 test. The second addresses the same company and basic fact pattern, but assumes a significantly 1030 lower carrying value, resulting in a test for which the MPAP is not a determining factor. Note 1031 that in both examples, the tests are the same in terms of the fundamental methods considered. 1032 However, the level of detail provided in support of MPAP-related assumptions in the second 1033 example is reduced to reflect the lack of MPAP significance in relationship to the test result.

²² The assumed fact pattern was selected to provide the greatest clarity and ease of exposition. Practitioners are unlikely to encounter exactly such circumstances; however, the Working Group believes the presentation applies to a broad range of situations.

1034 Conglomerate, Inc. and Subject Co. Reporting Unit

1035 Conglomerate, Inc. (Conglomerate) comprises three wholly owned subsidiaries, each of which is 1036 a separate reporting unit for purposes of ASC 350 compliance. The shares of Conglomerate are 1037 listed on a public exchange. At the date of Conglomerate's goodwill impairment test, the shares 1038 of Conglomerate traded at \$10.00 per share, with 105.0 million shares outstanding and total interest-bearing debt with a fair value of \$817 million. Therefore, market value of invested 1039 1040 capital (MVIC) for Conglomerate is established at \$1,867 million. The following discussion will 1041 address the analysis of one of the three reporting units, Subject Co., as well as the overall market 1042 capitalization reconciliation analysis for Conglomerate. The analyses of the second and third 1043 reporting units are not shown here but, for purposes of the market reconciliation discussion, are 1044 assumed to have been performed in a manner similar to that described for Subject Co.

1045

Scenario One Example

1046 Initial MPAP Consideration

1047 As a first step in the analysis of the Subject Co. and other Conglomerate reporting unit fair 1048 values, the general facts and circumstances are reviewed to assess the likely level of importance 1049 of the MPAP to the overall test result. The following facts are observed:

1050 • Conglomerate MVIC: \$1,867 million

• The reporting unit carrying values on a TIC basis:

			S ubject Co. Reporting Unit	Reporting Unit 2	Reporting Unit 3	Conglomerate Total	
1052		Carrying Values (millions)	\$690	\$420	\$870	\$1,980	
1053 1054	•	Premium over MVIC if Co $$1,980/$1,867 - 1 = 6.1\%$	nglomerate fa	ir value (FV) equals	s carrying value =	
1055 1056	•	Aggregate Conglomerate latest twelve months (LTM) Revenue and EBITDA are \$1,750 million and \$295 million, respectively					
1057 1058	•	Guideline public company information for Conglomerate as a whole indicates a range of multiples as follows:					
1059		LTM Revenue: .59X – 1.23X					
1060		LTM EBITDA: 4.5X to 7.0X					
1061	•	• Implied multiples if Conglomerate FV equals carrying value =					
1062	1062 Carrying value/LTM Revenue: \$1,980/\$1,750 = 1.13X						
1063		Carrying value/LTM EBITDA: \$1,980/\$295 = 6.71X					

1064 There are two factors that suggest a more robust approach is appropriate. The carrying value-1065 implied LTM multiples are in the high end of the range of observed guideline company 1066 multiples. This, in combination with the fact that a premium over MVIC is required for 1067 Conglomerate to pass the ASC 350 Step 1 test, indicates that the MPAP is likely to require a 1068 substantial level of support if a passing conclusion is reached for the Step 1 test. Similarly, if the 1069 unit fails, the MPAP will be critical to measuring the concluded impairment amount. Note that 1070 the MPAP and multiples required to pass all reporting units in a Step 1 test are likely to be higher 1071 than the "minimum required" levels calculated in this way as the aggregate company value is not 1072 likely to be distributed in exact proportion to the reporting unit carrying values.

1073 Income Approach – Subject Co.

1074 Following the initial MPAP considerations as described, a discounted cash flow analysis is 1075 performed to obtain a fair value indication for Subject Co. for use in Step 1 of the annual 1076 goodwill impairment test. Consistent with the guidance in ASC 820, the assumptions underlying 1077 this discounted cash flow analysis must reflect the perspective of market participants. Therefore, 1078 all available information is considered in assessing the appropriate cash flow forecast for use in 1079 the analysis. This information includes current management budgeting and forecasting processes. 1080 historical performance levels and historical performance vs. budget/forecast, guideline company 1081 performance metrics, and other specific facts and circumstances relevant to Subject Co.'s 1082 expected performance.

1083 In assessing the appropriate controlling market participants' forecast, three specific areas of 1084 economic benefit are considered as possibly accruing to the control buyer of Subject Co. and 1085 gather the following information regarding each:

1086 Revenue Synergies: Research regarding the likely market participants for Subject Co. • 1087 indicates that most of the buyers would benefit from revenue synergies related to inclusion of 1088 Subject Co.'s products in the broader, better-marketed product offerings of the buyer 1089 companies. The estimated revenue increase related to this benefit is reflected in higher 1090 revenue growth rates in forecast years one through five of 2.5 percent, 2.5 percent, 2.0 1091 percent, 1.5 percent, and 1.0 percent, respectively. These figures represent incremental 1092 growth above growth expected for Subject Co. on a stand-alone basis. As the market 1093 participant group is dominated by companies that would benefit from this synergy, it is 1094 appropriate to include the related cash flow benefits in the Subject Co. forecast. Note that for 1095 purposes of this example, the simplifying assumption is made that costs are fully variable in 1096 relation to the revenue synergy.

- 1097 Operating Expense Savings: The possibility of a control acquisition generating cost savings 1098 from elimination of duplicative support functions and/or economies of scale in purchasing is 1099 considered. However, a high percentage of these expenses are variable in nature and the fixed 1100 portion, which could give rise to acquisition synergies, is insignificant in relation to the value 1101 of Subject Co. Regarding potential economies of scale, the materials and services required by 1102 Subject Co. operations are substantially different from those required in the operations of all 1103 but one of the market participant group. Therefore, no operating expense-related market 1104 participant synergies are included in the Subject Co. forecast.
- 1105 Cost of Capital: The Company's credit rating is below that of the market participants, 1106 resulting in a higher cost of debt. It is determined that market participants would approach 1107 pricing decisions regarding Conglomerate or the separate reporting units using cost of debt 1108 assumptions in line with their own long-term financing costs as the target operations would be closely integrated with the buyers' existing operations and financial risk would be 1109 1110 reduced. Therefore, in estimating the appropriate Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 1111 for use in the Subject Co. analysis, the cost of debt is reduced to the observed market 1112 participants' level to reflect the economic benefits of acquisition relative to financing 1113 synergies.

As shown in Exhibit A (see appendix), the indicated fair value of the Subject Co. total invested capital indicated by the discounted cash flow analysis is \$740 million. This analysis has been simplified for the purposes of this VFR Advisory, and it is assumed that commonly accepted valuation methods and procedures would be followed in the determination of fair value.

1118 Market Approach – Subject Co.

1119 Where meaningfully comparable market information is available, it should be included in the fair 1120 value analysis. The following exhibit includes a form of market approach analysis, which is 1121 included in the determination of the final value conclusion for Subject Co. on a controlling basis. 1122 The income and market approaches should be used in a detailed, quantitative manner in instances 1123 where the MPAP is significant to the accounting outcome (assuming sufficient and reliable 1124 information is available to perform both approaches). In instances where the MPAP is not 1125 significant to the accounting outcome, the Working Group believes that best practices would still 1126 include consideration of both income and market value concepts, but would allow for a less 1127 detailed, gualitative application of one or more portions of the analysis. This fact pattern is 1128 discussed in the Scenario Two example in a subsequent section. Note that where guideline 1129 transaction data is available, it should be used in line with standard valuation practices. However, 1130 for purposes of simplification of this VFR Advisory, the transaction method has been omitted 1131 and only the guideline public company method of the market approach is shown.

1132 The following table summarizes relevant performance and valuation measures for the group of 1133 guideline public companies and the resulting TIC Foundation Value for Subject Co.

Guideline Public Com	ipany Data				Market		
	LTM Revenue	LTM EBITDA	Projected EBITDA Margin	Est. 5-Yr Revenue Growth	Value (Invested Capital)	MVIC / Revenue	MVIC / EBITDA
Company A	\$29,000	\$5,220	18.0%	5.0%	\$31,320	1.08	6.0
Company B	\$5,100	\$893	17.5%	6.0%	\$6,248	1.23	7.0
Company C	\$13,200	\$2,508	19.0%	5.0%	\$13,794	1.05	5.5
Company D	\$2,400	\$408	17.0%	4.5%	\$2,040	0.85	5.0
Company E	\$9,000	\$1,170	13.0%	-2.0%	\$5,265	0.59	4.5
MEDIAN	\$9,000		17.5%	5.0%		1.05	5.5
AVERAGE	\$11,740		16.9%	3.7%		0.96	5.6
Subject Company Selected Multiple	\$600	\$93	17.0%	6.1%		1.10	6.5
Value Indications							
Value Based on LTM	Revenue					\$660	
Value Based on LTM	EBITDA					\$605	
Concluded Value - N	Marketable, Non	control Basi	is (TIC Found	dation Value)	\$630	

Using this information, additional analysis of the guideline company characteristics and other traditional market approach considerations not shown, it is determined that revenue and EBITDA multiples appropriate for application in the fair value analysis of Subject Co., as indicated by the guideline public company analysis, are 1.10X and 6.5X, respectively. These multiples are based on characteristics of Subject Co. under current stewardship. A Subject Co. TIC Foundation Value indication of \$630.0 million is concluded. The application of an MPAP to this Foundation Value is then considered to obtain a market-derived value indication on a controlling basis.²³

1141 MPAP Estimation – Cash Flow Value

1142 A first step in determining the MPAP for application to the market-derived Foundation Value is a

1143 review of the market participants' acquisition synergies included in the cash flow analysis, as

1144 described in the Income Approach section above. The range of market premiums paid in recent

1145 control acquisitions of public companies is also reviewed.

²³ A discussion of the treatment of cash is beyond the scope of this Advisory. However, it generally is agreed that excess (nonoperating) cash should be excluded from a value to which an MPAP would be applied.

To quantify the premium implied by the market participants' synergies included in the cash flow analysis, a second cash flow analysis is run excluding these benefits. This analysis, shown in Exhibit B (see appendix), eliminates the revenue growth enhancements described for years one through five related to inclusion of Subject Co.'s products in the broader, better-marketed product offerings of the market participants. This analysis also shows an increase in the discount rate from 10.0 percent to 10.5 percent, reflecting the elimination of the debt financing benefits attributable to acquisition.

- 1153 The following table compares the metrics underlying the cash flow-based fair value measurement
- 1154 of Subject Co. with those underlying the Foundation Value cash flow analysis, as derived from
- 1155 comparison of the market participants' and Foundation cash flow analyses (Exhibits A and B).

	Foundation Value	Fair Value
Expected 5-yr Compound Annual Revenue Growth	6.1%	8.0%
Gross Profit Margin	60.0%	60.0%
Operating Expenses:		
Research & Development	5.0%	5.0%
Distribution Expenses	13.5%	13.5%
Selling Expenses	17.5%	17.5%
Other General & Administrative	7.0%	7.0%
E BITDA Margin	17.0%	17.0%
Weighted Average Cost of Capital	10.5%	10.0%
Total Invested Capital Value	\$660	\$740
TIC / Trailing Revenue	1.1	1.2
TIC / Trailing E BITDA	7.1	8.0
MPAP Implied by the Cash Flow Analyses		12.1%

Based on the results shown, the MPAP indicated by the cash flow analyses described is 12.1 percent on a TIC basis (21.6 percent on an equity basis at Conglomerates' actual debt/equity ratio of 44/56).²⁴

1159 **Observed Transaction Premiums**

1160 Consideration of premiums observed in guideline transactions is often appropriate; however,1161 such comparisons should be made carefully.

1162 Observed transaction premiums (using an Equity Foundation, as traditionally stated) for three 1163 guideline transactions range from 25.0 percent to 58.7 percent, as shown below.

²⁴ Equity Premium% = (TIC Premium%)/(Equity%) = 12.1% / 56.0% = 21.6%

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	Transaction Price Per Share	Shares Outstanding	Transaction Value (Equity)	Interest Bearing Debt	Transaction Value (TIC)	Unaffected Price Per Share	Observed Transaction Premium (Equity)	Observed Transactior Premium (TIC)
Company F	\$37.50	53.7	\$2,013	\$3,500	\$5,513	\$30.00	25.0%	7.9%
Company G	\$61.00	105.9	\$6,460	\$2,900	\$9,360	\$45.00	35.6%	22.1%
Company H	\$25.00	240.8	\$6,020	\$1,000	\$7,020	\$15.75	58.7%	46.5%
MEDIAN							35.6%	22.1%
AVERAGE							39.8%	25.5%

1164 This fact pattern demonstrates that relying only on observed transaction premiums to support a 1165 concluded or implied MPAP is potentially misleading. Since such premiums have traditionally 1166 been expressed as a percentage of Equity Foundation, differences in leverage between Subject 1167 Co. and the acquired companies can produce unreliable fair value measurements. For example, 1168 Company F is highly leveraged, causing the observed premium using an Equity Foundation to be 1169 materially higher than when expressed as a percentage TIC Foundation. When sufficient data is 1170 available to permit the calculation, expressing premiums as a percentage of total invested capital 1171 provides a more reliable basis of comparison across companies and is consistent with best 1172 practices. When expressed on a total invested capital basis, the implied premium for Subject Co. 1173 is 12.1 percent.

1174 If an analyst compared the equity-based MPAP for Subject Co. (21.7 percent) to the range of 1175 observed equity-based premiums for the guideline transactions (25.0 percent to 58.7 percent), the 1176 analyst might conclude that the fair value of Subject Co. is understated. However, on a total 1177 invested capital basis, the implied MPAP for Subject Co. falls within the range of the guideline 1178 premiums.

Each acquiree presents a different set of potential economic benefits that may or may not be comparable to those of Subject Co. For example, assume Company H reported a historical EBITDA margin of 13 percent, below that of Subject Co. and at the low end of the public peer group. The relatively low margins of Company H may correspond to superior cash flow enhancement opportunities, and therefore a higher MPAP. In this instance, applying an MPAP equal to the transaction premium observed for Company H to Subject Co. would potentially result in an overstatement of fair value.²⁵

²⁵ The Working Group observes that it may be appropriate to augment such analysis with a multi-year perspective on financial results.

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However, as discussed earlier, observed transaction premium data may be informative. The observed transaction premiums provide a composite view of the control benefits of cash flow enhancements and/or lower required rates of return perceived by the acquirers in the observed transactions. This may help to establish the reasonableness of the cash flow benefits assumed (or implied) by the fair value measurement under consideration. However, exclusive reliance on observed transaction premiums without careful analysis of relative financial performance, valuation multiples, and other metrics can result in an unreliable fair value measurement.

1193 MPAP Conclusion

1194 Multiple cash flow and cost of capital sources of MPAP for Subject Co. were reviewed, as well

as the range of premiums observed in relevant recent transactions. Based on this analysis, a TIC-

1196 basis MPAP of 12 percent is selected for application in the guideline company market approach.

1197 This determination is supported primarily by the cash flow synergies that market participants 1198 would be expected to consider in pricing an acquisition of Subject Co. Additional supporting

evidence was shown in the effects on the WACC as well as recent market transaction premiums

evidence was snown in the effects on the wACC as well as recent market transaction premiur

1200 paid for similar companies.

1201 Subject Co. Fair Value Conclusion

Based on the income and market analyses described, a fair value of \$725.0 million is concluded for Subject Co., which passes the Step 1 ASC 350 test, as follows:

Control Value Indication: Income Approach		\$740.0
Minority, Noncontrol Indication: Market Approach		\$630.0
Concluded MPAP, TIC Basis Control Value Indication: Market Approach		12.0% \$705.6
Concluded Fair Value of Subject Co.		\$725.0
Carrying Value: Subject Co.		\$690.0
ASC 350 Pass/(Fail)	Pass	\$35.0
Pass Percentage		5.1%
Note: All in US\$ Millions		

1204 Reconciliation to Market Capitalization

1205 Conglomerate is a publicly traded company comprising three reporting units. Following the 1206 procedures described for the Subject Co. reporting unit, fair values have been estimated for each 1207 of the three units. The total concluded value of all three of the Conglomerate reporting units is 1208 \$2,080 million and all three units are concluded to have passed the Step 1 test. A critical step in 1209 the valuation specialist's review of the reasonableness of the initial conclusions is a 1210 reconciliation of the results to Conglomerate's market value.

1211 The MVIC of Conglomerate as of the testing date, as described in the Initial MPAP 1212 Consideration section above, is \$1,867 million. Therefore, the premiums implied by the initial 1213 value conclusions are as shown in the following table.

Concluded Fair Value of Conglomerate TIC (sum of reporting units)	\$2,080.0
Test Date Price of Conglomerate S hares	\$10.0
Outstanding Conglomerate Shares (millions)	105.0
Conglomerate Equity Market Capitalization	\$1,050.0
Fair Value of Conglomerate Debt	\$817.0
MVIC of Conglomerate	\$1,867.0
MPAP Implied by Fair Value Conclusion	\$213.0
MPAP Implied by Fair Value Conclusion (Equity Foundation basis)	20.3%
MPAP Implied by Fair Value Conclusion (TIC Foundation basis)	11.4%
Note: All in US\$ Millions Except Price Per Share	
The Working Group notes that, as a practical expedient, adjustments made to account for normalized operating levels of cash.	are not

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- 1214 The reconciling 11.4 percent TIC Foundation MPAP (20.3 percent on an Equity basis) is shown 1215 to be reasonable based on the following:
- Specific cash flow benefits analysis (the cash flow benefits seen in the value differential supported in Exhibits A and B)
- Cost of capital benefits of acquisition described for Subject Co.

1219 Note that the economic benefits described for Subject Co. reporting unit are also assumed to be 1220 present at the same approximate level in the other reporting units not shown.

1221 Scenario Two Example

1222 As discussed above, determination of the level of detail appropriate to support MPAP 1223 assumptions is based on the likely significance of the MPAP in relationship to the test result. For 1224 example, if it is unlikely that the MPAP will be a determining factor in the pass/fail result of an 1225 ASC 350 Step 1 test, then the level of detail may be reduced from that included in the analysis 1226 shown in the Scenario One example in the prior section. To illustrate this concept, the Scenario 1227 One example is reconsidered with revision to the carrying values of the reporting units. The 1228 carrying value revisions, which represent the only change to the Subject Co. fact pattern described previously, are shown in the following table: 1229

		Subject Co.	Reporting	Reporting	Conglomerate	
		Reporting Unit	Unit 2	Unit 3	Total	
	Carrying Values (millions)					
1230	Revised for Scenario Two	\$440	\$350	\$500	\$1,290	

1231 Initial MPAP Consideration (revised carrying value example)

1232 With the lower carrying values shown, the valuation specialist's first step assessment of the 1233 likely level of importance of the MPAP to the overall test result provides the following revised 1234 fact pattern:

- Conglomerate MVIC: \$1,867 million (unchanged)
- The reporting unit carrying values on a TIC basis:

		S ubject Co. Reporting Unit	Reporting Unit 2	Reporting Unit 3	Conglomerate Total
1237	Carrying Values (millions)	\$440	\$350	\$500	\$1,290

• Premium over MVIC if Conglomerate FV equals carrying value = 1,290/1,867 - 1 = -30.9%

- Aggregate Conglomerate LTM Revenue and EBITDA are \$1,750 million and \$295 million, respectively (unchanged)
- Guideline public company information for Conglomerate as a whole indicates a range of multiples as follows (unchanged):
- 1244 LTM Revenue: .59X 1.23X
- 1245 LTM EBITDA: 4.5X to 7.0X

1248

- Implied multiples if Conglomerate FV equals carrying value =
- 1247 Carrying value/LTM Revenue: \$1,290/\$1,750 = 0.74X
 - Carrying value/LTM EBITDA: \$1,290/\$295 = 4.37X

1249 In this revised example, given the lower carrying values, the minimum premium over MVIC that 1250 would be required for Conglomerate to pass the ASC 350 Step 1 test shows a large cushion of 1251 over 30 percent, indicating that there is a reasonable possibility that each unit could pass the test 1252 before consideration of the MPAP. Additionally, the carrying value-implied LTM multiples are 1253 at or below the bottom end of the range of observed guideline company multiples. Therefore, the 1254 MPAP is unlikely to have any bearing on the outcome of the subject impairment test and the 1255 initial analysis of the reporting unit fair values is run with minimal supporting detail for the 1256 MPAP.

1257 The analysis of the Subject Co. fair value follows the same general process in this revised 1258 scenario as that shown in the Scenario One example. The differences in the details of the various 1259 steps in the analysis are summarized as follows:

- Income Approach: In establishing the forecast for use in the cash flow analysis, the same areas of potential acquisition synergy are considered as those described in the Scenario One example. However, the objective in doing so is only to establish that the types of synergies included represent appropriate market participants' assumptions. No specific quantification of the market participants' synergies is needed for purposes of quantifying the MPAP. However, it may be necessary to understand and quantify the market participants' synergies as an element of PFI when performing the valuation.
- Market Approach: The guideline public company analysis is performed in the same manner as shown in the Scenario One example through the point of estimation of the Foundation Value.
- MPAP Estimation: The estimation of the MPAP for application to the Foundation Value is 1271 then based only on a review of the guideline transaction premium information. The cash 1272 flow-based MPAP estimation process shown in the Scenario One example is eliminated as 1273 unnecessary, pending review of the fair value results for each reporting unit relative to its 1274 respective carrying value.

1275 The results of the test under this revised scenario are shown in the table below. A fair value of

- 1276 \$730.0 million is concluded for the Subject Co. reporting unit, and Subject Co. passes the Step 1
- 1277 ASC 350 test, as follows:

	\$740.0
	\$630.0
	15.0%
_	\$724.5
=	\$730.0
	\$440.0
Pass	\$290.0
	65.9%
	– Pass

1278 The cushion of \$290 million represents a wide (66 percent) margin over the Subject Co. carrying 1279 value. Therefore, results shown for Subject Co. clearly indicate that further, more detailed 1280 support for the MPAP is unnecessary for purposes of this analysis as the reporting unit passes the 1281 test by a margin well in excess of the 15 percent premium included.

- 1282 Regarding this more simplified analysis, the Working Group notes the following observations:
- The control value concluded for the market approach in this example (\$724.5) is higher than that concluded in the more detailed Scenario One example (\$705.6).
- The 15 percent MPAP, while within the range of market evidence from the exhibit on page 48, is lower than the average or median, reflecting consideration of the challenges regarding the transaction premium data discussed elsewhere in this Advisory.
- If the indicated average or median transaction premium from the market evidence on page 48 were simply used, the spread between the conclusion from the "detailed analysis" and the "simplified analysis" would be even greater. This suggests that the "simplified analysis"
 1290 could be overstating fair value.

• This result provides further evidence of the need for precaution in relying exclusively on the 1293 historical transaction premium data. Use of this data should be supported conceptually by 1294 characteristics of the subject entity that would influence the extent of a reasonable MPAP 1295 such as the qualitative factors discussed in the earlier section—*Business Characteristics* 1296 *Influencing Market Participant Acquisition Premium*—to narrow the range of observed 1297 premiums from the transaction data that may be applicable for the subject entity.

1298 Reconciliation of Market Capitalization (revised carrying value example)

The MVIC of Conglomerate as of the testing date is unchanged at \$1,867 million. The fair value conclusions for each of the reporting units have all been derived in the same manner as that described here in the Scenario Two revised carrying value example for Subject Co. and all three units are concluded to have passed the Step 1 test. The resulting total concluded value of the Conglomerate TIC is \$2,150,000. Therefore, the premiums implied by the value conclusions are as shown in the following table.

\$10.0 105.0 \$1,050.0
105.0 \$1,050.0
\$1,050.0
\$817.0
\$1,867.0
\$283.0
27.0%
15.2%
-

The reconciling 15.2 percent TIC Foundation MPAP (27.0 percent on an Equity basis) is shown to be reasonable. This determination is based on the general level of premiums observed in recent transaction premiums. While this type of support would not be sufficient in a case where a premium is necessary to the support the test results, the fact that no premium is required to establish a passing result for any of the Conglomerate reporting units allows for this more efficient, less detailed approach in this case.

SUMMARY

Because this VFR Advisory is intended to address best practices for the valuation of controlling
interests in business enterprises under the standard of fair value for financial reporting, certain
commentary is provided regarding this context.

1314 In fulfilling its mandate to provide best practices in the context of measuring fair value for 1315 financial reporting purposes, the Working Group introduced the term Market Participant Acquisition Premium, or MPAP. MPAP is defined here as the difference between: (1) the pro 1316 1317 rata fair value of the subject controlling interest; and (2) its foundation. The Working Group 1318 believes that valuation specialists most commonly associate the *foundation* with the pro rata fair 1319 value of marketable, noncontrolling interests in the enterprise. While this describes an MPAP 1320 Equity Foundation concept, a TIC Foundation may be more appropriate. The Working Group 1321 believes that best practices include expressing as well as applying the MPAP in the context of a 1322 TIC Foundation.

This Advisory asserts that MPAPs should be supported by reference to either enhanced cash flows or a lower required rate of return from the market participants' perspective. The Working Group anticipates such benefits will not in all instances exist or be reliably identifiable, thus, in such cases resulting in either no premium or a small premium. Notwithstanding the emphasis on cash flow and risk differentials in supporting MPAPs in fair value measurement, the Working Group acknowledges the merit of analyzing historical data regarding observed premiums from closed transactions when reliable data is available.

However, the Working Group cautions that exclusive reliance on observed premium data from
completed transactions provides, in most cases, insufficient support for a concluded MPAP.
Exclusive reliance on observed transaction premiums without careful analysis of the subject
entity's relative financial performance, valuation multiples, and other metrics can result in an
unreliable fair value measurement.

Various business characteristics are discussed that influence an MPAP, including characteristics of the market and industry, as well as both the subject entity and market participants. The exercise of prerogatives of control by acquirers may lead to economic benefits in many areas and the valuation specialist should review the typical business characteristics likely to influence the magnitude of the benefits available to market participants. The Working Group believes that use of the framework discussed will provide an important context for review of the valuation results and will increase the relevance and reliability of the associated fair value measurement.

A credible fair value measurement should include an assessment of the overall reasonableness of the measurement, including the MPAP applied or implied by the analysis. The level of rigor of analysis would depend on the importance of the MPAP to the fair value measurement. Factors—along with examples—are offered to evaluate the reasonableness of the fair value measurement of a controlling interest in a business enterprise.

EXHIBITS A AND B

EXHIBIT A

Market Participant Pers pective - Controlling Interest (in US\$ millions)

		C	ompound Anr	Iual Growth R	ate (Revenue,	i nrougn yea	r 5):	8.0%					
	Trailing		Year1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9	Year 10	Residual
Revenue	\$600		\$660	\$719	\$777	\$831	\$881	\$925	\$962	\$996	\$1,026	\$1,057	\$1,088
Revenue Growth			10.0%	9.0%	8.0%	7.0%	6.0%	5.0%	4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Gross Profit	360	60.0%	396	432	466	499	529	555	577	598	616	634	653
Operating Expenses:													
Research & Development	30	5.0%	33	36	39	42	44	46	48	50	51	53	54
Distribution Expenses	87	13.5%	89	97	105	112	119	125	130	134	138	143	147
Selling Expenses	105	17.5%	116	126	136	145	154	162	168	174	180	185	190
Other General & Adminis trative	45	7.0%	46	50	54	58	62	65	67	70	72	74	76
Total Operating Expenses	267	43.0%	284	309	334	357	379	398	413	428	441	455	467
EBITDA	93	17.0%	112	123	132	142	150	157	164	170	175	179	186
Depreciation & Amortization	25	_	25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
EBIT	68		87	97	103	110	115	119	124	127	130	132	137
Taxes	27	40.0%	35	39	41	44	46	48	50	51	52	53	55
DebtFree NetIncome	41		52	58	62	66	69	71	74	76	78	79	82
Incremental Working Capital		30.0%	18	18	17	16	15	13	11	10	9	9	9
Depreciation & Amortization			25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
Capital Expenditures		_	25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
Debt Free Cash Flow			34	40	45	50	54	58	63	66	69	70	73
R es idual Value													1,000
Dis counting Periods			0.5	1.5	2.5	3.5	4.5	5.5	6.5	7.5	8.5	9.5	9.5
PV Factor	10.0%		0.9535	0.8668	0.7880	0.7164	0.6512	0.5920	0.5382	0.4893	0.4448	0.4044	0.4044
PVDFCF			33	35	35	36	35	34	34	32	31	28	404
Total Invested Capital Value	\$740					R	Residual Value	Calculation					
Interes t-Bearing Debt	290					-	Residual Debt		w		\$73		
E quity Value	\$450					C	Cost of Capital			10.0%			
						E	stimated Resi	idual Growth R	ate	3.0%			
							Residual Capit			_	7.0%		
						R	Residual Value			_	\$1,000		
MPAP (Equity)	21.6%												
MPAP (TIC)	12.1%												
Relative Value Measures													
TIC /Trailing Revenue	1.2												
TIC /Trailing EBITDA	8.0												

Compound Annual Growth Rate (Revenue, Through Year 5):

8.0%

This analysis has been simplified for the purposes of this VFR Advisory. It is assumed that commonly accepted valuation methods and procedures would be followed in the determination of fair value.

EXHIBIT B

Forecast Under Current Stewards hip (in US\$ millions)

(in US\$ millions)		С	ompound Ann	ual Growth Ra	ate (Revenue,	Through Yea	ar 5):	6.1%					
	Trailing		Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	<u>Year 6</u>	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9	Year 10	<u>R es idual</u>
Revenue	\$600		\$645	\$687	\$728	\$768	\$807	\$847	\$881	\$912	\$939	\$967	\$996
Revenue Growth			7.5%	6.5%	6.00%	5.50%	5.00%	5.0%	4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	3.0%	3.0%
Gross Profit	360	60.0%	387	412	437	461	484	508	528	547	563	580	598
Operating Expenses:													
Research & Development	30	5.0%	32	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	47	48	50
Distribution Expenses	87	13.5%	87	93	98	104	109	114	119	123	127	131	134
Selling Expenses	105	17.5%	113	120	127	134	141	148	154	160	164	169	174
Other General & Adminis trative	45	7.0%	45	48	51	54	56	59	62	64	66	68	70
Total Operating Expenses	267	43.0%	277	295	312	330	346	363	379	393	404	416	428
EBITDA	93	17.0%	110	117	125	131	138	145	149	154	159	164	170
Depreciation & Amortization	25	_	25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
EBIT	68		85	91	96	99	103	107	109	111	114	117	121
Taxes	27	40.0%	34	36	38	40	41	43	44	44	46	47	48
DebtFree NetIncome	41		51	55	58	59	62	64	65	67	68	70	73
Incremental Working Capital		30.0%	14	13	12	12	12	12	10	9	8	8	9
Depreciation & Amortization			25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
Capital Expenditures		_	25	26	29	32	35	38	40	43	45	47	49
Debt Free Cash Flow			37	42	46	47	50	52	55	58	60	62	64
Residual Value													900
Dis counting Periods			0.5	1.5	2.5	3.5	4.5	5.5	6.5	7.5	8.5	9.5	9.5
PVFactor	10.5%		0.9513	0.8609	0.7791	0.7051	0.6381	0.5774	0.5226	0.4729	0.4280	0.3873	0.3873
PVDFCF			35	36	36	33	32	30	29	27	26	24	349
Total Invested Capital Value	\$660					-	Residual Value						
Interest-Bearing Debt	290 \$370						Residual Debt F	ree Cash Flov	W	4.0 50/	\$64		
E quity Value	\$370						Cost of Capital Estimated Resid	dual Crowth D	ata	10.5% 3.0%			
							Residual Capita		ate	5.0%	7.5%		
							Residual Value			_	\$900		
Relative Value Measures													
TIC /Trailing Revenue	1.1												
TIC /Trailing EBITDA	7.1												

This analysis has been simplified for the purposes of this VFR Advisory. It is assumed that commonly accepted valuation methods and procedures would be followed in the determination of fair value.

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Exhibit B

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